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The automobile industry has received unprecedented governmental support during the ongoing economic 
crisis. Rescue packages have been provided to sustain the signifi cant market branch and asserted key driver 
of growth, export, innovation, and jobs particularly in the EU and the United States and to avoid further 
downward spirals, which risk affecting the national economies on a wider scale. Since such tendencies can 
have trade distorting effects, however, the question arises whether the increased governmental interventions 
are compatible with the World Trade Organization (WTO) legal framework, which arguably enshrines 
free trade theory in international law. By adopting a legal perspective, this contribution shall address the 
state’s role in global markets and examine the degree of policy space that is conferred to WTO Member 
States in support of real economy sectors.
1. Introduction
Since September 2008, the global economic crisis that has been lurking on the horizon 
became blatantly visible, shaking fi rst the fi nancial sector and hence global economy to 
their very foundations. In response to this worldwide predicament, rescue packages have 
been tied by national governments, with the objective of supporting different market sec-
tors. In 2007, the fi nancial bailout of the British high-profi le Northern Rock bank hit 
the headlines, only to be followed one year later by the US bailout programmes for major 
fi nancial institutions such as Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
as well as Lehman Brothers before its collapse. Such programmes were still based on the 
hope that markets would be in a position to provide the essential funds to recapitalize the 
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 banking sector as a whole on a wider scale.1 The substantive state interventions imple-
mented as a reaction to the crisis by several national governments and the European Union, 
not halting before the ‘sacred cows’ of macroeconomic policies, have shaken the confi dence 
underlying the Western capitalist system, culminating in declarations that capitalism and 
what is commonly associated with this economic policy is in fact dead.2 Central banks 
have adopted measures to enhance liquidity such as interest rate reductions, which were 
conducted in view of preventing recession and securing the states’ fi nancial situation, not 
least by stimulating the granting of credits to the real economy.3 Corresponding to their 
emergency character, several actions have been adopted ad hoc and on a  short-term basis. 
The fi rst responses primarily included recapitalization measures.4
As the crisis eventually spread to affect sectors of the real economy, governments 
were willing to support several industry branches in order to sustain specifi c markets 
and prevent rising unemployment levels and reduced consumer demands. Standing out 
as an illustrative example is the governmental support provided in favour of the automo-
bile industry and its largest companies such as General Motors Corporations (GM) and 
Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) in the United States, as well as its subsidiary Adam Opel 
GmbH in Europe. Effective state measures adopted included enhancing the businesses’ 
access to fi nancing, for example, by direct provisions of capital in loan contracts. Indeed, 
the direct government payments to the auto industry have been massive as a glance at 
the fi gures provided in the United States illustrates. As an example, GM received approxi-
mately USD 50 billion in federal aid; Chrysler was granted USD 6.6 billion in exit 
fi nancing on top of USD 4 billion it had originally received to avoid bankruptcy and 
in addition to an immediate loan granted by the Canadian government.5 The amounts 
of funding provided to the automobile industry have to be put into perspective in view 
of the total investments that governments have undertaken as a reaction to the current 
fi nancial crisis. According to the latest numbers, fi nancial and sectoral support measures 
have increased the estimate of headline support to 32% of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the G20 countries. The upfront fi nancing provided by the US is estimated to 
amount to USD 900 billion, that is, 6.3% of GDP.6 In the EU the support of the banking 
1 G. Wehinger, ‘Lessons from the Financial Market Turmoil: Challenges ahead for the Financial Industry and Policy 
Makers’, OECD 2008 Financial Market Trends, <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/25/41942918.pdf>, 7 (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
2 See also Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Luis Servén, ‘Are All the Sacred Cows Dead? Implications of the Financial Crisis 
for Macro and Financial Policies’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4807, January 2009, <http://econ.world-
bank.org> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
3 Such an approach has been illustrated by the interest policies adopted by both the Federal Reserve System and 
the ECB.
4 See  Wehinger, above n. 1, at 7 et seq. with an overview over some major policy responses, which included, inter alia, 
fi nancial support to subprime lenders, rescues of individual major fi nancial institutions by government purchases of assets, 
swaps of government securities, debt issuance, the implementation of general and coordinated government guarantees and 
insurances, and capital injections for the fi nancial industry.
5 See ‘General Motors Corporation Overview’, The New York Times, 16 Jun. 2009, <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
news/business/companies/general_motors_corporation/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=GM%20&st=cse> (visited 23 Jun. 
2009);  ‘Chrysler LLC Overview’, The New York Times, updated 10 Jun. 2009, <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ 
business/companies/chrysler_llc/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=chrysler&st=cse> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
6 See IMF Update on Fiscal Stimulus and Financial Sector Measures, 26 Apr. 2009, <http://imf.org/external/np/
fad/2009/042609.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
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sector alone has amounted to about 13% of GDP with approved funds worth another 
31% of GDP. Indeed, the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU is estimated to have sur-
passed the 60% mark in 2008 and to reach 79.4% until 2010.7
Besides direct payments, the support of national economies was addressed, inter alia, by 
reducing taxation, in order to raise consumer demand, and support export opportunities.8 
Furthermore, states acquired preferred shares, thus establishing public-private partnerships 
according to which shareholders’ equity is increased.9 Indeed, according to GM’s restruc-
turing plan and agreement with both the US Treasury and the Canadian and Ontario 
governments, the ‘new GM’ will be owned by the US Treasury holding 60%, the Canadian 
and Ontario governments holding 12.5%, besides the new  Voluntary Employee Benefi ciary 
Association (New VEBA) holding 17.5% and 10% held by  unsecured bondholders.10
In the globalized world of today, such developments seem to reverse the shift in 
perception that became apparent at the latest with the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
 challenging the role of the states as the primary players and subjects of the international 
legal framework according to traditional Westphalian notions of international law and 
factually attributing private players, including individual and legal persons, a substan-
tial position. Such developments were based, inter alia, on the still prevailing economic 
theory on free trade and growth, according to which market interventions by national 
governments are generally deemed problematic. From this point of view, governmental 
interferences risk to throw the open self-regulated economies off balance and to falsify 
the equilibrium implied by the free market, thus resulting in ineffi ciencies and global 
trade distortions. On the basis of such perceptions, the Final Declaration of the Sum-
mit on Financial Markets and the World Economy held on 15 November 2008 by the 
Group of Twenty (G20) emphasized that the reforms and actions taken to mitigate the 
global fi nancial crisis had to be ‘grounded in a commitment to free market principles’ and 
generally rejected protectionism despite the present times of uncertainty.11 This  statement 
7 European Commission, Public Finances in EMU 2009, European Economy, 10th edn, Brussels, 5 Jun. 2009, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance/publications/publication_summary15289_en.htm> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
8 See, e.g., the Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area Countries, adopted at the Sum-
mit of the Euro Area Countries on 12 Oct. 2008, <www.eu2008.fr> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
9 As an example, the US government has not shied away from purchasing preferred stock from Citigroup, thus 
becoming holder and owner of about one-third of the bank’s equity.  Additionally, in Germany, the expropriation of private 
stockholders has been discussed in general (see ‘Gesetz zur weiteren Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes (FMStErgG)’ [BGBL 
I S 725], which entered into force on 9 Apr. 2009. See also James Wilson and Bertrand Benoit, ‘Germany ready to move 
on radical HRE plan’, Financial Times, 19 Mar. 2009, <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4d22f5f8-1426-11de-9e32-0000779fd2ac.
html?nclick_check=1> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); ‘The state and the economy: Germany, how to restart the engine? ’, The 
Economist, 14 Mar. 2009, 28–29). Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Banking Act, which entered into force on 
21 Feb. 2009, is noteworthy in this respect. Indeed, the third stabilization option under the UK Banking Act goes as far as 
allowing the bank in question to be taken into temporary public ownership (see ss 11–13 of the UK Banking Act 2009, 
<www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2009a> (visited 23 Jun. 2009). See also ‘Bank bail-outs: Quids pro quo’, The Economist, 20 Nov. 
2008, <www.economist.com/fi nance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12651361> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
10 Existing GM shareholders have, however, objected to this plan according to which they are expected to be wiped 
out. See ‘GM Announces Agreement with US Treasury and Canadian Governments Providing Fast Track to Competi-
tive Future for New GM’, 1 Jun. 2009, <www.gm.com/restructuring> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); The Associated Press ‘New 
Objections May Delay GM Exit from Bankruptcy’, The New York Times, 19 Jun. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/
business/20auto.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
11 G20 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, DC, 15 Nov. 2008, 
<www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/2008-leaders-declaration-081115.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
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has been repeated over and over again ever since, not least by the Director-General of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), Pascal Lamy, the Central Bank Governors and the 
Group of Seven (G7) Finance Ministers, as well as the high-level participants at the G20 
conference in early 2009.12
The increased governmental interventions into the economy of private enterprises 
have raised questions on whether governments are assuming a new role in private indus-
try and the globalized markets. Is there a shift taking place, away from the free market 
towards increased regulation and governmental ownership? Are we facing an era of a new 
economic system or a new form of capitalism as the speech of France’s President, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, held in Toulon on 25 September 2008 would suggest?13 And how are such new 
developments compatible with the current regulatory frameworks in place?
It is diffi cult to obtain verifi ed, precise, and reliable information due to the fact 
that WTO Members seem rather reluctant to provide offi cial information to the WTO 
Secretariat in the current turbulent situation.14 The objective of this contribution is 
therefore not the presentation of an actual case study and its solution. Rather a more 
abstract approach is chosen. In light of the recent developments, the subject matter on 
governments’ market participation in the real economy shall be revisited by casting light 
on the states’ support of the automobile industry, which has become a conspicuous 
example of governmental intervention particularly in Europe and the United States.15 By 
adopting a legal perspective, the paper addresses the state’s role in global markets from 
a WTO law point of view, which is arguably addressed as the fundamental legal frame-
work that enshrines the worldwide economic system and its underlying values. Thereby, 
two aspects of the trade-dimension of governmental support of the auto industry can 
be distinguished: First, the state measures improve the credit of auto companies relative 
to their foreign competitors and strengthen the ties between the fi rms and the govern-
ment. Second, the emerging ‘Car Czars’ could use this power in sales competition against 
foreign brand rivals.16 The contribution shall tackle the differentiation between legal and 
illegal state interventions in support of the automobile industry under WTO law and 
12 See WTO News Item of 9 Feb. 2009, <www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tpr_09feb09_e.htm> (visited 
23 Jun. 2009); Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Rome, 14 Feb. 2009, <www.g7fi nance.
tesoro.it> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); see the G20 Leaders’ Statement, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, London, 
2 Apr. 2009, at paras 22–24; see also the wording of the G20 countries’ different communiqués, all available at <www.g20.
org/pub_communiques.aspx> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
13 Or in the words of Nicolas Sarkozy: ‘L’autorégulation pour régler tous les problèmes, c’est fi ni. Le laissez-faire, 
c’est fi ni. Le marché qui a toujours raison, c’est fi ni’ (Original speech is available at <www.sarkozynicolas.com/nicolas-
sarkozy-discours-de-toulon-texte-integral> (visited 23 Jun. 2009)).
14 See unoffi cial fi rst Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, 
23 Jan. 2009, WTO Doc. JOB(09)/2, at para. 6, kindly made available by the WTO Information and External Relations 
Division.
15 An assessment of the European interventions into the banking sector in the context of the current fi nancial 
crisis is provided in a further contribution (Rolf H. Weber & Seraina Grünewald, ‘Finanzkrise und Wirtschaftspolitik: 
 Herausforderungen für das Europäische Wettbewerbsrecht’, Zeitschrift für Europarecht (EuZ) 3 (2009): 58–67. For an eco-
nomic analysis of the purpose and design of the GATT/WTO framework, see, e.g., Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The 
Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: MIT Press, 2002).
16 Claire Brunel & Gary Clyde Huf bauer, ‘Money for the Auto Industry: Consistent with WTO Rules?’, Petersen 
Institute for International Economics, February 2009, <www. petersoninstitute.org> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
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shall assess the scope of discretion that states possess in the free market in compatibility 
with the international trade legal framework.
2.  The Free Trade Theory Revisited: States’ Role to Play in Free Markets
Although different theoretical economic models have been developed, the current eco-
nomic system is based on economic growth and free market theories, that is, a liberal 
system whose origins can be traced back to the eighteenth century and the oeuvres 
written by Adam Smith17 and David Ricardo18 in particular. Based on the assumption 
that international free trade generates global gains, which supply the trading partners 
with benefi ts in the short term and growth and development in the longer run,19 the 
theory of comparative advantage frames the backbone of the international trading system 
until today.20 This school of thought started to materialize during the Second World War 
with the prominent Atlantic Charter21 that laid the cornerstones for the establishment 
of a multilateral trading system, which was formally initiated by the conference of the 
political leaders of the time in Bretton Woods, USA, in 1944.22 Furthermore, the estab-
lishment of a market-based economy was particularly illustrated by the creation of the 
single integrated internal market of the EU23 which signifi cantly expanded to encompass 
the Central-Eastern European countries since the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Although the free market theory has been strongly criticized and cannot be deemed 
undisputed, since the 1990s, its prevailing position has been endorsed by a vast normative 
framework established inter alia under the auspices of the United Nations24 and institution-
alized not least by international organizations such as the WTO, as well as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank having, among others, laid the foundations 
for the liberalization of international capital and monetary transactions; while the IMF 
17 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (edited by Edwin Cannan), (Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press, 1976). For an overview on Smith’s theory, see Karl Pribram, Geschichte des ökonomischen 
 Denkens, Band I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 243–261.
18 David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John Murray, 1817) (reprinted in London/
Rutland 1973), 81.
19 H. Jessen, ‘Trade and Development Law’, in Sustainable Development in World Trade Law, eds Markus W. Gehring & 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 77–101, at 98.
20 For an overview on international trade history, see Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of 
International Trade, 3rd edn (London/New York: Routledge 2005), at 1–26; see also Alan O. Sykes, ‘Comparative Advantage 
and the Normative Economics in International Trade Policy’, Journal of International Economic Law 1 (1998): 49–82 at 60–61. 
See also Pribram, above n. 17, at 280–318.
21 Offi cial Statement on Meeting Between the President and Prime Minister Churchill (14 Aug. 1941), in The Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Random House, 1950), 314.
22 Generally, on the proceedings of the conference, see Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations  Monetary 
and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 1–22 Jul. 1944 (1948); for an overview, see Rolf H. Weber 
& Douglas W. Arner, ‘Toward a New Design for International Financial Regulation’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
 International Law 29 (2007): 393–400.
23 See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 28–29 
Jun. 1985, COM(85) 310.
24 See the commitment to a liberal multilateral trading system reiterated in several documents adopted under the 
auspices of the United Nations, e.g., at para. 13 of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 Sep. 2000, UN Doc 
A/RES/55/2 stating: ‘We are committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and nondiscriminatory multilateral 
trading and fi nancial system.’ This was reiterated, e.g., in paras 27–32 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 Oct. 2005, 
UN Doc A/RES/60/1.
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 specifi cally works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure fi nancial stability, and facil-
itate international trade, the World Bank is mandated to advance the vision of an inclusive 
and sustainable globalization by providing low-interest loans, interest-free credits and grants 
to developing countries for a wide array of purposes. Not surprisingly, the Preamble to the 
Agreement establishing the WTO sets ambitious goals with the following words:
Recognizing that their relations in the fi eld of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
 growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade 
in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environ-
ment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in interna-
tional trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading sys-
tem encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberaliza-
tion efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this mul-
tilateral trading system,
Agree as follows: (...)25
As preambular clauses, such objectives do not provide for directly enforceable legal 
obligations. Nevertheless, they constitute specifi c values and guidelines underlying the 
global multilateral trading system under the auspices of the WTO legal framework.
With the establishment of the legal branch of international economic law under 
the auspices of its regulatory bodies, nation states have placed themselves into the 
 double-edged position of eventually curtailing their own infl uence on the global markets 
by opting for a multilateral trading system. It has become a rather common claim that 
the nation states are rapidly losing their infl uence on the international sphere as a con-
sequence of globalization, or in other words, due to increasing networks of governance 
regimes, particularly restraining national political autonomy. This development is – not 
coincidentally – also referred to as a time of ‘post-nationalism’.26
As already implied by the notion of free markets, the theoretical framework places 
special emphasis on the economic mechanisms that are to be held free from market 
interventions. According to Smith, the welfare of society is thus coupled with the con-
sistent multiplication of production in what he referred to as a ‘progressive state’. A pro-
gressive state, he argued, is based on a ‘laissez faire’ policy, ensuring a broad scope for the 
development of an open economy by granting its individuals a free hand regarding the 
25 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 Apr. 1994, WTO Doc LT/UR/A/2, 
 emphasis adopted from the original document.
26 Markus Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2003), xvii.
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setting of market parameters such as price formation and the functioning of competi-
tive structures. In his terms, a ‘well-governed society’ supports and protects ideal market 
conditions. The role of the state, according to Smith, was thus seen in the promotion of 
reduced trade barriers, the furtherance of economic and innovative potential, and the 
supply with trade supportive communication and transport systems.27 Apart from such 
tasks, the states were also entrusted with a prominent role in terms of a sociopolitical 
responsibility for public welfare. For example, they were deemed responsible for tackling 
and countervailing potentially damaging tendencies in the free market in support of the 
common good. Indeed, already Smith approved the regulation of the banking sector and 
the control of the rate of interest.28 A certain degree of mistrust characterized his skepti-
cal approach towards the ‘bankers’, namely, the ‘few individuals, which might endanger 
the security of the whole society’,29 a position of eye-catching topicality in light of the 
current fi nancial and economic deteriorations.
Such a limited role of the state and a general focus on market mechanisms have been 
readopted by various modern economic theories and have culminated in trends often asso-
ciated with the Chicago school of economics, also referred to as the so-called freshwater 
school of economics. According to this school of thought, regulatory market interventions 
generally result in less effi cient processes than would be achieved by the absolute realiza-
tion of free markets in terms of the invisible hand. Governments’ participation is thus cut 
back as far as possible to avoid ineffi cient outcomes, based on the trust in ‘natural’ market 
processes. The Chicago School has been subject to severe criticism, particularly by the 
 so-called saltwater schools of economics based in the coastal universities of the United 
States, such as notably Harvard, MIT, and Berkeley, splitting the US continent in two.30
Without having to go as far as such ‘market fundamentalist’ views, governments’ 
interventions into free markets have been deemed particularly problematic based on 
several lines of reasoning. Apart from the general comprehension that interventions into 
the free market lead to ineffi ciencies, there is the argument that, in addition to their lack 
of expertise, government offi cials will often face confl icts of interest originating from 
their dependency of an electorate or political base and reward supporters, respectively. 
Moreover, the ultimate consequence of private mismanagement in a market economy, 
namely, bankruptcy, is generally no imminent worst case scenario for the public sector. 
To the contrary, bureaucrats will often lack incentives that reward effi cient resource 
allocation.31
27 Smith, above n. 17, Book I, Ch. I, at 15.
28 Smith, above n. 17, Book II, Ch. II, 342–345, 350; Id., Book II, Ch. IV, 379–380; on education in the context of 
employment, see particularly Book I, Ch. X, 111 et seq.
29 Smith, above n. 17, Book II, Ch. II, at 344–345.
30 On the Chicago school of economics, see, e.g., Milton Friedman, On Economics: Selected papers (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2007); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); George 
J. Stigler, Chicago studies in political economy (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1988). More critical assessments 
on the Chicago school of economics are provided, e.g., by Sherryl Kasper, The revival of laissez-faire in American macroeconomic 
theory (Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2003); Robert H. Nelson, Economics as religion: 
from Samuelson to Chicago and beyond (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).
31 Demirgüç-Kunt/Servén, above n. 2, at 12–16.
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In the specifi c context of the economic crisis, two particular points of criticism were 
uttered. On the one hand, it was considered as problematic that governments occupy the 
role otherwise played by the market, by determining who the ‘winners’ and the ‘loosers’ 
should be. Instead of letting market mechanisms ‘reward’ and ‘punish’ the market partici-
pants, the governments have assumed responsibility for deciding in an administrative pro-
cess, which market players they are willing to support and which ones they prefer to drop. 
On the other hand and especially in light of the bailout programmes of the United States, 
such an interference was interpreted as an unfair transfer of wealth from ordinary tax payers 
to the rich world, that is, the upper percentage of infl uential managers and CEOs, whereas 
the rest of the world was burdened by the losses resulting from the economic crisis.32
Despite the objections against the government as a market participant, however, 
the expectation that public welfare can be achieved without governmental interven-
tion, based on a sole self-regulative economy, has proved to be rather illusionary. This is 
particularly refl ected in the development of different conceptions and theories on com-
petition and antitrust enforcement,33 as well as with regard to the roles of policies and 
institutions regarding economic development.34 Indeed, government ownership of banks 
as a consequence of banking crises has been a rather popular instrument throughout 
history. Furthermore, the state as a ‘temporary caretaker’ of fi nancial institutions and the 
central bank function as a lender of last resort has not always been equally disputed.35 
Such a wider comprehension of states’ responsibilities can also be seen as an underlying 
pillar of an emerging legal theory on international trade regulation and a rationale for 
the establishment of a legal framework under the auspices of the WTO, not as a restric-
tion of markets and of freedom according to deregulation and neoliberal philosophies, 
but moreover as a foundation of markets and freedoms.36
3. Framing the Challenges
3.1. Governmental market participation’s conceptualization in general
State action must – in accordance with the rule of law – be endorsed by legislative acts. 
Regulations, as the name suggests, generally refer to the elaboration of ‘rules’ in  promotion 
32 See, e.g., Eric Dash, ‘Few Stand to Gain on this Bailout, Many Lose’, The New York Times, 7 Sep. 2008, <www.
nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08scorecard.html?scp=10&sq=winners%20loosers%20credit%20crisis&st=cse> 
 (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
33 Rolf H. Weber, Wirtschaftsregulierung in wettbewerbspolitischen Ausnahmebereichen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsge-
sellschaft, 1986), 49–62; see also Krajewski, above n. 26, at 18–20. See Robert Pitotsky (ed), How the Chicago School Overshot 
the Mark (Oxford: OUP, 2008).
34 Douglas W. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and the Role of Law (Cambridge/New York et al.: CUP, 
2007), 14–22.
35 Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, above n. 2, at 12 et seq. with further references.
36 Thomas Cottier & Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation, Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union 
and Switzerland, Cases Materials and Comments (Berne/London: Staempfl i Publishers Ltd./Cameron May Ltd. London, 
2005), 44 et seq. on a legal theory on international trade law, which seems to lack tradition in legal theory, however, being 
undisputedly of paramount importance for the functioning of international trade; see also Thomas Cottier, ‘Challenges 
Ahead in International Economic Law’, Journal of International Economic Law 1–13 (2009), 5. See also Id., 4–6, 10–11 on 
the role of law.
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of specifi c economic and social objectives.37 Two approaches can be distinguished that 
address the economic rationale for legitimate governmental regulation differently:38 (1) 
According to traditional perceptions on state regulation the states’ responsibilities and 
administrative competences, respectively, are often limited to the particular public policy 
objectives that cannot be effectively and effi ciently achieved by market mechanisms. 
In cases of ‘market failures’39 or if the markets’ unregulated outcomes are not deemed 
‘just’ or ‘fair’ in society,40 state intervention and regulation are seen as a viable and nec-
essary option in the public interest; thereby, economic and non-economic policy goals 
can be distinguished. The state is thus called upon in terms of the subsidiarity principle, 
that is, after the market-based approach has failed to achieve the intended outcomes.41 
(2) A more recent school of thought based on public choice theory perceives regulatory 
policies as serving primarily private interests and is referred to as private interest regula-
tion.42 A particular focus branch is the regulatory capture theory.  This doctrine is critical 
on the perception of regulatory interventions as being strictly motivated by the objec-
tive of protecting public goods and refers to situations in which governments regulate 
in favour of the commercial or special interests dominating the industry or sector that is 
regulated, as opposed to public interests.43
In accordance with public interest regulation approaches, but historically pre-
 existing, is the comprehension that, in times of crisis, states undisputedly have to be in the 
position to adopt the measures necessary to secure their functioning. Such a perception 
of a state’s role can be traced back to the very origins of the nation state and is indeed 
conceived as a core understanding of state duties and responsibilities. It is generally well 
grounded in states’ constitutions and can also be referred to as a general principle of 
law recognized in international law according to Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.44 On the international stage, this principle of ‘necessity’ 
has been adhered to as a justifi cation for states’ non-compliance with other international 
state obligations. According to Article 25 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 
Articles on State Responsibility,45 necessity can prevent the wrongfulness of an act not 
37 For a conceptualization of ‘regulation’, see Krajewski, above n. 26, at 1 et seq.; Weber, above n. 33, at 27–38.
38 Krajewski, above n. 26, at 12 et seq.
39 According to economic theory, several major areas of market failures can be distinguished, namely, (1) natural 
monopolies, (2) externalities, (3) information defi ciencies, (4) ruinous competition, (5) natural scarcity of goods. For an 
overview on market failures, see Krajewski, above n. 26, at 13–16; Weber, above n. 33, at 98–126.
40 For example, it is generally acknowledged that private business practices resulting in monopolies, cartels, or other 
joint practices such as the abuse of dominant market positions may limit competition and consequently cause welfare losses, 
which are deemed as unjust and unfair in society. Non-economic goals such as ethical values of distributional or social 
justice objectives are more controversial. See Krajewski, above n. 26, at 18–20.
41 For a thorough overview on normative public choice, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III, 3rd edn  (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2003), 563–656.
42 Krajewski, above n. 26, at 20–21.
43 See, inter alia, George J. Stigler, ‘The theory of economic regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Sci-
ence 2 (1971): 3–21.
44 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 Jun. 1945, <www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=
2&p3=0> (visited 23 Jun. 2009). Art. 38(1)(c) reads: ‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it shall apply: …c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.
45 ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 3 Aug. 2001, adopted at the 
ILC’s fi fty-third session and reported to the General Assembly in November 2001, 53 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 43, UN 
Doc A/56/10.
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in conformity with an international obligation, if the state’s act chosen instead ‘(a) is the 
only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists or of the international community as a whole.’
Necessity has been invoked to preclude the wrongfulness of acts contrary to a very 
wide panoply of state obligations in order to protect various interests ranging from the 
protection of the environment and the securing of the safety of a civilian population 
to the preservation of the very existence of a state and its people in times of public 
emergency.46 The latter argumentation was adopted not only in light of armed confl icts 
and terrorist attacks47 but also as a legal line of argument for the justifi cation of a state 
not clearing its debts due to fi nancial diffi culties.48 However, stringent conditions have 
to be met in order to reach compliance with Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility. Inter alia, essential interests must be threatened by grave and imminent 
peril and the chosen course of action taken by the state must be the ‘only way’ available 
to safeguard that interest.
Despite general concerns accompanying governmental action in free markets, it is 
thus recognized that states have a role to play in a liberal economic system. This is all the 
more the case with regard to economic crises, in which it amounts to a state responsi-
bility to secure its own standing with a sound economic system, ultimately ensuring its 
own survival and, not least, economic stability, as well as employment and real income 
for its citizens. As a consequence, the question cannot be framed as whether states are in 
the position to adopt regulatory measures but moreover on the qualitative aspects of the 
characteristics and the extent of legally justifi ed state interventions.
Generally speaking, governments possess a broad scope of discretion regarding the 
adoption of state measures. Recommendations are given, for example, by the IMF in favour 
of a stable international economic system or the International Bank for  Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).49 Both the 
IBRD and the IFC in particular have set up a Bank Recapitalization Fund, which will 
not only provide fi nancing but also provide for advisory services for the strengthening 
of the private sector development and the improvement of the economic and fi nancial 
46 For an overview, see the examples to Art. 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, printed in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, 
Part Two. See also International Court of Justice (ICJ), Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 
25 Sep. 1997, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, ICJ Reports 1997, at 88.
47 On the legal responses to violent crises and emergencies see Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of 
Crisis, Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge/New York et al.: CUP, 2006).
48 See Russian Indemnity Case, 11 Nov. 1912, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards (UNRIAA), 
Vol. XI (1912), 421–447, at 442–443, in which the Ottoman Empire drew on ‘force majeure’ to justify its delay in pay-
ing its dept to the Russian Government. The case is also outlined in the commentaries to the ILC Draft Articles on the 
 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, above, n. 46, at 81. See among others, Christian Tietje, ‘Die 
 Argentinien-Krise aus rechtlicher Sicht: Staatsanleihen und Staateninsolvenz’, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, 
Heft 37, February 2005, <www.telc.uni-halle.de/Heft37.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009), at 16 et seq.
49 R.H. Weber & V. Menoud, The Information Society and the Digital Divide, Legal Strategies to Finance Global Access 
(Zurich/Basel/Geneva: Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, 2008), at 70–107.
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performance;50 such general recommendations and advice, however, do not amount to 
much more in terms of legal bindingness than policy guidelines.51 In the case of a granted 
IMF loan, the IMF Member country’s discretion may, however, be limited by an arrange-
ment with the IMF according to which the state in question is held to implement spe-
cifi c policies and measures to resolve its balance of payments problem. Other than that, 
on an international level, monetary policy is exercised on the basis of broad discretion 
and within international networks of central banks and monetary authorities, with the 
Basle Accords as examples of such soft law regulations. Similarly, in the aftermath of the 
current crisis, a set of principles was established by the G20, which may provide for some 
non-binding guidance.52 However, hardly any stringent law is in place, albeit the fact that 
fi nancial services form a dense and specialized area of domestic law.53
On a regional level, the EU legal framework stipulates the obligation of states to 
inform the European Commission about the potential domestic implementation of 
state aid measures in order to uphold the principles of fair competition and a single 
market; the Commission’s approval is a necessary prerequisite for the state aid’s compat-
ibility with the internal market. Furthermore, Article 87 paragraph 3(b) EU54 provides 
for an exception to the general prohibition of possibly anticompetitive state aids in the 
case of ‘serious disturbance of the economy of a Member State’. The general impor-
tance of acting in a coordinated manner within the framework of the single market 
and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been repeatedly emphasized on a 
European level and thus obliges the Member States to collaborate and coordinate their 
action.55 In view of the current credit crunch, the European Commission has provided 
a detailed overview on Member States’ manifold opportunities for public support under 
existing state aid rules and has set out additional state aid measures, which Member 
States may grant temporarily in order to remedy diffi culties regarding access to fi nance 
and to promote investment pursuing environmental objectives in particular with the 
adoption of the Temporary Community Framework for State aid measures to support 
access to fi nance in the current fi nancial and economic crisis, which applies until 
31 December 2010.56
50 See <www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/BE76390D8137548385257515007AE5D6?> Open Document 
and the IFC Bank Recapitalization Fund Fact Sheet, <www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/IssueBrief_
BRF/$FILE/IssueBrief_BRF.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
51 Obviously, if the country is in severe fi nancial trouble and thus poses a potential threat for the international 
fi nancial system, which the IMF is responsible to help protect, the IMF lending program may be initiated, which entails 
several further state duties.
52 G20 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, above n. 11.
53 Cottier, above n. 36, at 4–5.
54 Treaty on European Union (Nice consolidated version), 24 Dec. 2002, OJ 2002 C 325/5.
55 See the outcome of the Informal Meeting of Heads of State or Government held in Brussels on 1 Mar. 2009, press 
release, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/106390.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
56 Communication from the Commission – Temporary Community Framework for State Aid Measures to  Support 
Access to Finance in the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, 7 Apr. 2009, OJ 2009 C 83/1 (consolidated version). 
On state aid measures in support of environmental protection under EU competition law, see R.H. Weber & M. Grosz, 
‘Erleichterte Beihilfengewährung zugunsten des Umweltschutzes – Legitimation von Wettbewerbsverzerrungen in 
 Krisensituationen’, in Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2008/2009, eds Astrid Epiney & Nina Gammenthaler (Zürich/
Basel/Genf: Schulthess Verlag, 2009), at 365–384.
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Beyond such requirements, no harmonized regulatory and legally binding frame-
work is in place to steer governmental intervention into a specifi c direction in times 
of economic crises. However, the different other obligations a state assumes, which 
may amount to legally binding regulatory schemes, limit the governments’ latitude in 
 choosing policy responses. The following study shall focus on the obligations states incur 
under the WTO legal framework.
3.2.  Governmental support of the real economy during the 
current economic crisis
In response to the current fi nancial deteriorations, unprecedented fi nancial rescue pack-
ages were tied up and continue to be laced in order to prevent the collapse of the 
national economies involved and reduce the risk of contagion throughout the interna-
tional fi nancial system.
The most signifi cant actions taken in terms of governmental support of specifi c 
industry branches concern the automobile industry, where several countries including 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States 
have introduced support packages in favour of domestic automakers, which included fed-
eral loans and loan guarantees, incentives for car buyers and car dealers, as well as support 
for research and improved innovation.57
Due to the fact that the automobile industry produces goods that may be deemed 
as nice to have as opposed to a necessity for living, it could be questioned whether the 
governmental support implemented for the benefi t of the automobile industry cor-
responds to the sector’s importance for the economy.58 However, the focus on such a 
rather ‘luxurious’ market branch shall not obscure the fact that linked to the automobile 
industry are numerous jobs and thus various individuals that are affected by the dete-
riorations of the current economic crisis. Reasons for the specifi c focus on the recovery 
of the automobile industry as a specifi c branch of the real economy are manifold. The 
governments’ fi rm and generous reactions have been ascribed to the fact that at  present, 
the automobile sectors are signifi cant economic engines of nations, not least due to 
their key driver function for growth, exports, innovation, and jobs and their strong link-
age to a wide variety of other sectors.59 The automotive industry has increasingly come 
under pressure in the context of the dramatic rise of energy prices in summer 2008, in 
addition to the general fi nancial meltdown; in the US in particular, this sector lived on 
57 See the third Report to the TPRB from the Director-General on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-
Related Developments, 14 Jul. 2009, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/OV/W/2,  at paras 72, 75, 94, and the fi rst Report to the 
TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at para. 37; International Cen-
tre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), ‘WTO Report Finds “Limited Evidence” of Protectionism amidst 
Economic Crisis’, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 13, no. 3 (28 Jan. 2009). See also ‘The state and the economy: Germany’, 
The Economist, above n. 9 at 28–29; ‘The state and the Economy: France, Back in the driving seat’, The Economist, 14 Mar. 
2009, 29. See also Brunel & Hufbauer, above n. 16, at 4–6.
58 OECD Report, Economic Policy Reforms, Going for Growth 2009, <www.oecd.org> (visited 23 Jun. 2009), 
at 20 and at 24–25.
59 Communication from the Commission – Responding to the crisis in the European automotive industry, 25 Feb. 
2009, COM(2009) 104 fi nal, 1.
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credits similar to the housing markets, a fact that is often employed to explain the quite 
simultaneous downturn of these markets.60
While different measures are applied on a local level, the extent of the support pro-
vided nationally within the United States, on the one hand, and regionally within the 
European Union, on the other hand, stands out in particular. To be precise, the response 
adopted by the European Union as a supranational organization in this regard should be 
distinguished from nation states’ governmental interventions.61 However, not least due to 
its economic authority, the EU’s reactions were frequently compared to the arrangements 
adopted on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
In response to the crisis, the United States enacted the Emergency Economic Stabi-
lization Act (EESA) in October 2008, authorizing the United States Secretary of Treasury 
to spend up to USD 700 billion to purchase distressed assets, such as mortgage-backed 
securities, and make capital injections into the banking sector. The purpose of this bail-
out of the United States fi nancial system includes the restoration of liquidity and the sta-
bilization of this sector of the United States according to a comprehensive, harmonized 
strategy.62 In February 2009, the Obama Administration set further priorities to address 
the economic crisis ‘on all fronts’ with the Financial Stability Plan.63
In light of the mounting pressure on the automobile manufacturers GM and Chrysler 
in particular, the President Bush administration had already agreed to an  emergency bail-
out by providing USD 13.4 billion from the Troubled Assests Relief  Program (TARP) 
funds that US Congress had authorized to rescue the fi nancial industry.64 Under the 
Obama administration and based on the EESA, further investment programs were 
enacted, which also targeted the real economy in the fi eld of the automobile industry in 
particular with the Automotive Industry Financing Program.65 While the Task Force on 
the Auto Industry continued to review the restructuring plans submitted by both GM 
and Chrysler, the US Department of Treasury announced an ‘Auto Supplier Support 
Program’ in March 2009 with the aim of providing up to USD 5 billion to stabilize the 
auto industry.66 It had become apparent that both GM’s and Chrysler’s survival were in 
substantial doubts without additional government loans.
60 See the third Report on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 57, at 
paras 23 et seq. See also Brunel & Hufbauer, supra n. 16, at 1, 2, 5; Eric Dash, ‘Auto Industry Feels the Pain of Tight Credit’, 
The New York Times, 27 May 2008, <www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/business/27auto.htm> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); Larry 
Webster, ‘GM in Crisis – 5 Reasons Why America’s Largest Car Company Teeters on the Edge’, Popular Mechanics, 18 Nov. 
2008, <www.popularmechanics.com/automotive/new_cars/4292379.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
61 For a brief outline, see EU Press Release, State aid: Overview of national measures adopted as a response to the 
fi nancial and economic crisis, Brussels, 16 Feb. 2009, MEMO/09/67.
62 Section 2 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, H.R. 1424, <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h1424enr.txt.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
63 See the Fact Sheet on the Financial Stability Plan, 10 Feb. 2009; see also the Treasury White Paper on the Capital 
Assistance Program and its Role in the Financial Stability Plan. Both documents and further information is available at 
<www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa> and <www.fi nancialstability.gov> (both visited 23 Jun. 2009).
64 See ‘General Motors Corporation Overview’, above n. 5. See also Brunel & Hufbauer, supra n. 16, at 2 with 
further references.
65 They also include the Capital Purchase Program, the Targeted Investment Program, the Program adopted for the 
backup of the American International Group Inc. (AIG) on fi xed rate cumulative perpetual preferred stock offering. The 
agreements are available at <www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/eesa/agreements/index.shtml> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
66 See the Fact Sheet on the Auto Supplier Support Program, <www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/supplier_ 
support_program_3_18.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
982 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
Chrysler indeed combined its restructuring plan with an increase of its original 
loan request on USD 3 billion by another USD 2 billion. While US President Obama 
rejected the plan, the Canadian government announced an immediate loan of USD 201 
million. Nevertheless, after the government’s task force had concluded that Chrysler 
could no longer survive as a stand-alone company, Chrysler was ordered to complete a 
partnership with the Italian automaker Fiat or face bankruptcy. The US government was 
strongly involved in the restructuring process of the enterprise, which included talks with 
the Chrysler debt holders.67 After negotiations with smaller creditors failed, however, 
the corporation was forced to seek Chapter 11 protection. On 10 June 2009, Chrysler 
emerged from bankruptcy after having restructured its enterprise and particularly having 
transferred assets to Fiat. The US government provided Chrysler with USD 6.6 billion 
in exit fi nancing.68
In addition to the fi nancial support given to the automobile industry, including 
the backing of warranties for providing consumers with enough confi dence to con-
tinue purchasing cars, the government’s interventions in policy making and governance 
decisions stand out as signifi cant interferences in the private industry’s matters. They 
became striking when Mr. Wagoner, GM’s chairman and chief executive, was forced 
to resign as a condition for the US government to continue extending their fi nancial 
aid. Furthermore, the state’s auto task force had concluded in its report that GM was 
apt to make considerable progress in developing new energy-effi cient cars and was 
given sixty days to present a cost-cutting plan for their restructuring while being kept 
afl oat by the government during that time. However, after having received more than 
USD 20 billion from the state but estimating that tens of billions more were necessary 
to save the corporation, and in light of the fact that bondholders were reluctant to 
swap the loans for stock in the reorganized company, GM declared bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 on 1 June 2009.69 GM’s restructuring plan now envisages that the majority 
of the company’s assets are transferred to a ‘new GM’, with the US government set to 
emerge as the biggest shareholder with a 60% stake, and the governments of Canada 
and Ontario adopting another 12.5%, thus leading to a process of GM’s nationalization. 
Furthermore, 17.5% will be adopted by the United Auto Workers (UAW), whereas 
67 Bill  Vlasic & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘US Expected to Give More Money to Automakers’, The New York Times, 
28 Mar. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/business/economy/28auto.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg & Bill Vlasic, ‘US Lays Down Terms for Auto Bailout’, The New York Times, 30 Mar. 2009, <www.nytimes.
com/2009/03/30/business/30auto.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); Z. Kouwe & M. Maynard, ‘Chrysler Bankruptcy 
Looms as Deal on Debt  Falters’, The New York Times, 30 Apr. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/business/30auto.
html?hp=&pagewanted=print>  (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
68 See ‘Chrysler LLC Overview’, above n. 5; see also M.J. De la Merced & M. Maynard, ‘Fiat Deal with Chrysler Seals 
Swift 42-Day Overhaul’, The New York Times, 11 Jun. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/global/11chrysler.
html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); see also J. Rutenberg & Bill  Vlasic, ‘Chrysler Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection’, The New 
York Times, 30 Apr. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/business/01auto.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
69 See ‘General Motors Corporation Overview’, above n. 5; see also B. Simon, N. Bullock, & J. Macintosh, ‘GM in 
race to depart Chapter 11 protection’, The Financial Times, 2 Jun. 2009, <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/829647ac-4f96-11de-a692-
00144feabdc0.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); Tom Braithwaite, Julie MacIntosh, Bernard Simon, & John Reed, ‘GM to fi le 
for Chapter 11 protection’, The Financial Times, 31 May 2009, <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e75423ac-4df8-11de-a0a1-00144-
feabdc0.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
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the remaining 10% will be distributed among the bond holders of the original GM 
enterprise.70
The collapse of the big players in the automobile industry and GM in particular 
consequently had a severe impact on the companies’ subsidiaries in Europe, such as 
Opel and Saab Automobile AB. With help from the German government and from the 
 Canadian-Austrian car parts maker Magna International, Opel’s bankruptcy was fi nally 
prevented. The German government brokered a deal for an alliance between the Russian 
bank Sberbank and GM, each acquiring 35% stake of Opel, as well as Magna Interna-
tional, which will own 20%. Ten percent will be held by Opel employees.71 By contrast, 
the Swedish government was not prepared to provide Saab with governmental aid. Saab 
will now be sold to a consortium headed by a Swedish maker of luxury sports cars, pro-
vided that USD 600 million of fi nancing will be granted from the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and guaranteed by the Swedish government.72
On a supranational level, the European Union also endeavours to take coordinated, 
joint action to ensure a more effective and credible response, enabling the EU to act as 
a whole in a united manner. For this purpose, the measures adopted are held to comply 
with the regulatory framework in place on state aid according to the EC Treaty and as 
outlined above. In light of the current economic turmoil, the Commission has adopted a 
temporary framework applicable to state aid measures.73 Additionally, budget policies must 
be in line with the rule-based framework provided with the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), which coordinates national fi scal policies in the EMU in order to ensure sound 
public fi nances.74 In November 2008, the European Commission adopted a European 
Economic Recovery Plan with two major pillars based on the fundamental principles 
of solidarity and social justice. The fi st pillar envisages boosting demand and stimulating 
confi dence, by injecting purchasing power into the economy. The Commission proposed 
an agreement to adopt an immediate budgetary impulse of EUR 200 billion. The second 
pillar relies on direct short-term actions to reinforce Europe’s competitiveness in the long 
term, by adopting a comprehensive programme to direct action to ‘smart’  investment. 
70 See, inter alia, Bernard Simon, ‘GM plans comeback a month early’, The Financial Times, 19 Jun. 2009, <www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/ba24d158-5c6a-11de-aea3-00144feabdc0.html?> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); see also GM Press Release, above n. 10.
71 N.D. Schwartz, ‘With Sale, GM Europe Avoids Fray’, The New York Times, 1 Jun. 2009, <www.nytimes.
com/2009/06/02/business/global/02euro.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); J. Dempsey & D. Jolly, ‘Effects of Opel Deal Rip-
ple Across Europe’, The New York Times, 31 May 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/business/global/01opel.html> 
(visited 23 Jun. 2009).
72 See ‘Saab Automobile AB Overview’, The New York Times, updated 16 Jun. 2009, <http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/business/companies/saab_automobile_ab/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=saab&st=cse> (visited 23 Jun. 2009); see 
also S. Lyall, ‘Sweden Says No To Saving Saab’, The New York Times, 23 Mar. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/world/
europe/23saab.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
73 See Communication from the Commission – The Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation 
to Financial Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis, 25 Oct. 2008, OJ 2008 C 270/8; Communi-
cation from the Commission – The Recapitalization of Financial Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of 
Aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards Against Undue Distortions of Competition, 15 Jan. 2009, OJ 2009 C 10/2; 
Communication from the Commission – Temporary Community Framework for State Aid Measures, above n. 56.
74 For more information on the SGP, see <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi nance/sg_pact_fi scal_policy/index_
en.htm?cs_mid=570> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
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Furthermore the ‘Actions for Recovery’, suggested by the European Commission75 envis-
ages to put the right objectives into place.76 A specifi c policy response to the crisis in 
the automotive sector was provided in late February 2009 by the European  Commission 
and endorsed by the Council of the European Union one month later; it adheres to 
the CARS 21 Mid-term review High Level Conference conclusions, as adopted on 
29  October 2008, as the guiding forces for the future decision-making processes.77 Fur-
thermore, it allocates primary responsibility for dealing with the crisis to the industry but 
additionally aims at creating framework conditions and targeted and temporary public 
sector support at both the supranational and the domestic Member State’s level, by restor-
ing the availability of fi nancing and restoring liquidity, boosting demand for new vehicles, 
and accelerating fl eet renewal, safeguarding skills, and employment, as well as minimiz-
ing social costs, and ensuring open markets and fair competition.78 The Council thereby 
invited the Commission (1) to assess any possible new legislative initiatives in line with 
the principles by avoiding unnecessary administrative burdens on businesses, (2) to pres-
ent by the end of 2009 a roadmap of envisaged (legislative and non-legislative) initiatives 
with a signifi cant impact on the automotive industry approximately over the next three 
years, and (3) to continue the dialogue with the industry and the relevant stakeholders as 
a follow-up of the CARS 21 initiative on a regular basis.79 Furthermore, the European 
Commission’s initiatives to tackle the impact that the current economic deteriorations 
have on employment deserve mentioning in this context.80
On a more institutional level, the European Central Bank (ECB) has reduced 
interest rates and has adopted further measures in accordance with the national central 
banks in order to ensure the liquidity of the fi nancial system and to maintain confi -
dence and stability.81 In the same context, the EIB decided to mobilize EUR 30 billion 
to support European small and medium sized-enterprises (SMEs) and endorse infra-
structure  projects.82 In March 2009, the directors of the EIB authorized an amount of 
75 Communication from the Commission – A European Economic Recovery Plan, 26 Nov. 2008, COM(2008) 
800 fi nal. See also Communication from the Commission for the Spring European Council – Driving European Recov-
ery, 4 Mar. 2009, COM(2009), 114 fi nal. See furthermore the Recovery Plan’s precedent documents, namely, Presidency 
Conclusions, Brussels, 15 and 16 Oct. 2008, 14368/08; Communication from the Commission – From Financial Crisis to 
Recovery: A European Framework for Action, 29 Oct. 2008, COM(2008) 706 fi nal.
76 Regarding the specifi c automotive industry, the main objectives set out by the Recovery plan are (1) the support 
of demand in order to assist with remedying the effects of the credit squeeze, (2) the facilitation of the adjustment by cush-
ioning the costs associated with restructuring in particular for workers and their upgraded training, (3) the encouragement 
of the modernization of the plants to ensure sustainable competitiveness of the industry at a world wide level, and (4) the 
assistance of the industry to implement the radical technological change required by the climate change challenge.
77 The CARS 21 Mid-Term Review High Level Conference, Conclusions and Report can be found at <http://
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/cars21_mtr_report.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
78 See Communication from the Commission – Responding to the crisis in the European automotive industry, 
above n. 59. See also Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the automotive industry 6227/09, adopted 
on 10 Mar. 2009, <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/7367_09_en.pdf> 
 (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
79 See Council Conclusions on the automotive industry, above n. 78, at para. 10.
80 Communication from the Commission – A Shared Commitment for Employment, 3 Jun. 2009, COM(2009) 
257 fi nal.
81 See, e.g., European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin January 2009, <www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mobu/mb200901en.
pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
82 See EIB communication, EIB launches new loans for SMEs, 3 Oct. 2008, <www.eib.org/about/news/eib-loan-
for-smes.htm> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
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EUR 3 billion in loans to Europe’s auto industry with further fi nancial support expect-
ed.83 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) tied a further 
fi nance package that allows for an increase in the EBRD’s annual business volume of 
about 20% in 2009, which amounts to approximately EUR 7 billion. This cash injection 
also aims at supporting the banking sector where the EBRD invests and at ensuring the 
fl owing of fi nance, specifi cally to SMEs. In late February 2009, the heads of the World 
Bank Group, the EBRD, and the EIB communicated their willingness to cooperate in 
a joint programme to lend up to EUR 24.5 billion, in order to fi nd solutions to tackle 
the economic crisis particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.84
Most notably, both the US and the EU have linked their fi nancial support of the 
auto manufacturing sector to innovative ecological projects in the fi elds of energy effi -
ciency, green technology, etc.85 The original loan and security agreement between the 
US and GM prior to bankruptcy held that the fi nancing secured by the state was to be 
implemented for developing business with minimal adverse effects on the environment 
and to enhance the capacity of the enterprise and its subsidiaries to develop and produce 
energy-effi cient advanced technology vehicles; GM was particularly required to submit 
to the US Treasury Department a detailed restructuring plan, demonstrating long-term 
viability and including information on the transformation of its business to include fuel-
effi cient cars and trucks and to enhance environmentally safe automobile production.86 
The ‘new GM’ now aims at increasing its investment and leadership in fuel economy and 
advanced propulsion technologies, thereby reaffi rming its commitment to improve the 
fuel effi ciency of its vehicles. Regarding Chrysler, the task force instructed the forming 
of a partnership with Fiat as a condition for receiving another round of government aid. 
Fiat had signalled its readiness to transfer new technologies for the production of new 
energy-effi cient cars and motors in the United States.87
In order to enhance its environmental performance, the EU has temporarily autho-
rized its Member States to ease access to fi nance for companies through subsidized 
guarantees and subsidies for investments going beyond EU environmental standards.88 
Furthermore, the EU has adopted a framework for the particular sector of the  automotive 
83 See EIB communication, EIB Directors approve EUR 3 billion in loans to Europe’s auto industry, 12 Mar. 2009, 
<www.eib.org> (visited 23 Jun. 2009). See also Brunel & Hufbauer, above n. 16, at 5–6. 
84 Communiqué by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank 
Group and the World Bank Group, Joint IFI Action Plan In Support of Banking Systems and Lending to the Real Economy 
in Central and Eastern Europe, 26 Feb. 2009, <www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2009/com.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
85 Furthermore, US Congress considered the establishment of a National Incentive Program for Voluntary Retire-
ment of Fuel-Ineffi cient Vehicles, also referred to as ‘Cash for Clunkers’. See Brunel & Hufbauer, above n. 16, at 3–4. 
86 See the Loan and Security Agreement between the US Treasury and GM, 31 Dec. 2008 and the 2009–2014 
Restructuring Plan, 17 Feb. 2009. Both documents are available at <www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/eesa> (visited 23 Jun. 
2009).
87 See ‘Chrysler LLC Overview’, above n. 5; B. Vlasic and S. Gay Stolberg, ‘US Expected to Give More Money 
to Automakers’, The New York Times, 28 Mar. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/business/economy/28auto.html> 
(visited 23 Jun. 2009); Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Bill Vlasic, ‘US Lays Down Terms for Auto Bailout’, The New York Times, 30 
Mar. 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/business/30auto.html> (visited 23 Jun. 2009)>; Z. Kouwe and M. Maynard, 
‘Chrysler Bankruptcy Looms as Deal on Debt Falters’, The New York Times, 30 Apr. 2009,<www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/
business/30auto.html?hp=&pagewanted=print> (visited 23 Jun. 2009). See also Brunel & Hufbauer, above n. 16 at 2–3. 
88 See Communication from the Commission – Temporary Community Framework for State Aid Measures, above 
n. 56, at para. 4.5.
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industry, with the objective of not only offering ‘a cushion for the automotive industry 
in a time of intense pressure, but a springboard for the future.’89
4. State Interventions Under WTO Law
4.1. Preliminary remarks
State interventions implicate different problematic aspects. Besides entailing possible distor-
tions of competition in the specifi c sectors, which are subject to Article 87 of the EC 
Treaty on a regional level, such attempts also threaten to amount to trade barriers, which are 
addressed by the states’ international trade law obligations under the WTO legal framework.
International trade regulation essentially addresses the confl icts of interests emerging 
from discussions on domestic or regional trade policy instruments with regard to their 
potentially restrictive effects on market access for goods and services. The question on 
the tolerable and legal extent of governmental interventions in free markets is thus a very 
essential element of international trade law.
Nevertheless, the WTO’s institutional and regulatory framework does not address the 
role of the states in general. Its wording merely implies that it aims at the reduction of 
tariffs and other protectionist trade barriers, as well as at the elimination of discrimina-
tory treatment in international relations. Thereby the WTO Preamble refers to the ‘basic 
principles… [and] objectives underlying this multilateral trading system’. Although the 
WTO Agreement does not expressly name such ‘basic principles’, their content can be 
deduced from the different trade agreements adopted under the WTO umbrella frame-
work. Generally speaking, the concept of non-discrimination may be interpreted as found-
ing one of the most generic characteristics of trade liberalization. Its two forms, namely, 
 ‘most-favoured-nation treatment’, on the one hand, and ‘national treatment’, on the other 
hand, lie at the core of the multilateral trading system.90 International trade regulation has 
the overall objective of reducing differential treatment and securing equal conditions of 
competition for foreign and domestic comparable products. The fundamental distinction 
between protectionism and legitimate policy goals thus becomes decisive. Contemporary 
economists generally agree on the economic theory fundamental, namely, that free trade 
increases overall welfare. Protectionism, on the contrary, is deemed as reducing such global 
gains and is consequently perceived as an unwanted characteristic of any trade regula-
tion.91 WTO law consequently aims at reducing trade barriers that are implemented to 
protect domestic industries from foreign competition. Such measures may amount to 
89 See Communication from the Commission – Responding to the crisis in the European automotive industry, 
above n. 59, at 2–3. See also Press Release of the Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Contribu-
tion of the Council (Environment) to the Spring European Council (19 and 20 Mar. 2009), 28th Environment Council 
Meeting, Brussels, 2 Mar. 2009.
90 Krajewski, above n. 26, at 6; on these principles in more depth, see, inter alia, John H. Jackson, The World Trading 
System, Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: MIT Press, 1997), 
157–173, 213–228; Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 49–111; Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 346–427; Peter Van den 
Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge, New York et al.: CUP, 
2005), 307–372.
91 Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 54–55.
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explicit import barriers such as quantitative import restrictions or tariffs or may come 
to light in more subtle forms, such as domestic regulations, which, in effect, discriminate 
against imports although, at fi rst glance, they seem to treat all competitors alike.
The different measures adopted by the states in the aftermath of the economic 
downturn, particularly in order to backup the real economy branches, such as the auto-
mobile industry, as well as the construction, steel, and airline sectors, risk to result in 
potentially protectionist measures, with the aim of shielding domestic producers from 
the economic crisis: Besides the packages adopted in favour of the stimulation of the 
domestic economies outlined above, tariffs have been raised considerably.92 Furthermore, 
various potential non-tariff trade barriers have been introduced, ranging from govern-
mental support for certain market branches to anti-dumping measures, which have been 
induced against specifi c imports,93 the imposition of increased licensing requirements,94 
direct trade restrictions, as well as the limitation of open ports and airports for particu-
lar imports.95 Although some countries have established measures to facilitate trade in 
these diffi cult times,96 the concerns of illegality of such potentially protectionist subsidiz-
ing measures prevail; a corresponding communication has already been uttered by the 
 European Commission chief José Manuel Barroso regarding the United States aids for its 
struggling auto industry.97 Against this background, world leaders have repeatedly warned 
about protectionism as a path to global economic ruin that should be  categorically 
avoided, to prevent the worsening of the economic situation for all and the decline of 
prospects for an early recovery.98
It is in view of such considerations that the subsequent outline shall examine the 
measures adopted for the support of the automobile industry, after drawing an outline 
on the applicable international rules on subsidization. The focus is set on this particular 
market branch as an example of a supported real economy sector, for the purpose of 
shedding light on the states’ admissible margin of discretion under the WTO/General 
92 For example, the MERCOSUR Member States have agreed in November 2008 to raise their common external 
tariff by 5% points on average on specifi c items, such as wine, dairy products, textiles, leather goods, and wood furniture (see 
fi rst Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at para. 26).
93 Such an estimation, however, is based on informal reports; offi cial WTO data are not yet available (see fi rst Report 
to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at para. 35).
94 Argentina has imposed such requirements on products considered as sensitive, such as auto parts, textiles, TV, toys, 
shoes, and leather goods (fi rst Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Develop-
ments, above n. 14, at para. 29).
95 Indonesia as an example has limited its open ports to fi ve, which may serve as entry points for imports (fi rst 
Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at para. 28). For 
an overview on the trade-related policy measures adopted, see Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis 
and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at paras 25–37.
96 For example, India adopted import restrictions on steel products in November 2008 (fi rst Report to the TPRB 
on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at para. 25), China has increased VAT 
rebates on its exports, Argentina has cut its export taxes on wheat and corn by fi ve percentage points, etc. (fi rst Report to 
the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 14, at para. 33).
97 See, e.g., ‘EU might complain to WTO over US car plan – Barroso’, Thompson Reuters, 14 Nov. 2008, <www.reu-
ters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSLE47953820081114> (visited 23 Jun. 2009). ‘Barroso Theatens to Take US to WTO 
over the Car Rescue Plan,’ Europolitics, 14 Nov. 2008.
98 See WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy’s speech held on 9 Feb. 2009 in presenting his report on recent trade 
developments associated with the fi nancial crisis, stating: ‘we must remain extremely vigilant’ (<www.wto.org> (visited 23 
Jun. 2009)). See also fi rst Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, 
above n. 14; G20 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, above n. 11.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules on subsidization when interfering in the 
market’s equilibrium.
4.2. Applicable rules on subsidization
Rules addressing generally ‘unfair’ trade situations, which are now distinguished into 
‘dumping’ and ‘subsidization’ under international trade law, can be traced back much 
further than the nineteenth century. National provisions addressing subsidies seem to 
have evolved tightly linked to the regulations on countervailing duties, that is, the 
importing countries’ response to subsidized imports. The development of multilat-
eral international rules applicable to subsidies and countervailing measures (SCM) 
in particular, however, began with the establishment of the GATT and was further 
developed under this legal framework’s auspices.99
4.2.1. Subsidies’ Regulation in the GATT
Subsidies are addressed in the GATT 1994 in Article VI, in Article III:8(b), and in Article 
XVI, without however providing for a defi nition on subsidies.100 These provisions’ main 
features already existed under the GATT 1947.
(1) Article VI of GATT 1994 allows anti-dumping and countervailing duties to be 
levied by members on imports that are deemed to cause harm to domestic industries 
due to their subsidization by a foreign government.101 Section 3 of Article VI delin-
eates the term ‘countervailing duty’ as meaning ‘a special duty levied for the purpose 
of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manu-
facture, production or export of any merchandize’. Such duties may be imposed on 
99 On the applicable rules’ evolution, see Jackson, above n. 90, at 285–293. See also Carsten Grave, Der Begriff 
der Subvention im WTO-Übereinkommen über Subventionen und Ausgleichsmassnahmen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 
66–81 and 82–100; Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 262 et seq.; Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 990 et seq.; Van den 
Bossche, above n. 90, at 551 et seq.; Marc Benitah, The Law of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System (London: Kluwer 
Law  International, 2001); G.E. Luengo Hernández de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law, 
Confl icts in International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 33 et seq.; Gary Horlick & Peggy A. 
Clarke, ‘The 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement’, reprinted in Gary Horlick (ed.), WTO & NAFTA Rules and Dispute Reso-
lution: Selected Essays on Antidumping, Subsidies and other Measures (London: Cameron May Ltd, 2003), 21–38; Gary Horlick, 
Reinhard Quick & Edwin Vermulst, ‘Government Actions Against Domestic Subsidies, An Analysis of the International 
Rules and an Introduction to United States’ Practice’, Legal Issues of European Integration 1 (1986): 1–51, reprinted in Gary 
Horlick (ed.), WTO & NAFTA Rules and Dispute Resolution: Selected Essays on Antidumping, Subsidies and other Measures 
(London: Cameron May Ltd, 2003), 39–100, at 42–63, with a particular focus on domestic subsidies under the GATT 
and the Subsidies Code. On services subsidies, see Pietro Poretti, ‘Waiting for Godot: Subsidy disciplines in services trade’, 
in GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services, eds Marion Panizzon & Nicole Poh & Pierré Sauvé 
 (Cambridge/Newyork et al.: CUP, 2008), at 466–488.
100 Finding a defi nition of subsidies under the GATT legal framework indeed proved to be an ambitious undertak-
ing. See, inter alia, S. Alessandrini, ‘Subsidies, Strategic Trade Policies and the GATT’, in Subsidies and International Trade, ed. 
J.H.J. Bourgeois (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991): 5–16; see also G. Depayre & R. Mauro Petric-
cione, ‘Defi nition of Subsidy’, in Subsidies and International Trade, ed. J.H.J. Bourgeois (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1991), 67–74.
101 Historically, the US predominated as a user of countervailing duties. From 1995 to 2003, developed countries more 
generally stood out as implying countervailing duties. Such a development may be interpreted as illustrating the distinctive 
views of subsidies on an international level and the particularly limited international agreement on the status of subsidies as 
policy instruments. Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 262; see also Horlick/Quick/Vermulst, above n. 99, at 48–50.
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any imported product of a contracting party and are held to be limited to the amount 
equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted either in 
the process of manufacture, production, export, or transportation. The countervailing 
duties are addressed together with anti-dumping duties in Article VI of GATT 1994 
because they both address  ‘below-normal value pricing’102 of the products at issue.103 
However, a line of distinction is drawn between subsidization as a distorting govern-
ment practice and dumping as a potential pricing policy of private market players.104
(2) Article III:8(b) excludes the payment of subsidies from the national treatment 
according to Article III of GATT 1994. It thereby encompasses subsidies to domestic 
producers, payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes 
or charges, as well as subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic 
products. As a consequence, the terms of the General Agreement acknowledge the right 
of the contracting parties to adopt certain measures they deem necessary, for example, to 
foster economic development or to protect domestic industry.105
(3) With Article XVI of GATT 1994, the regulation of subsidies was sought to be 
strengthened under the General Agreement; at the time of the establishment of the 
GATT 1947, it only contained one provision, which was further expanded to encom-
pass provisions on export subsidies in 1955 and, fi nally, in 1960, an illustrative list of 
export subsidies was included as an aid for interpretation.106 Section A of Article XVI 
now addresses subsidies in general, thereby stating that parties granting or maintaining 
subsidies are held to notify the other contracting parties in writing ‘of the extent and 
nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity 
of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of 
the circumstances making the subsidization necessary’. The possibility of limiting such 
subsidization shall be subjected to discussion between the contracting parties concerned 
in the case that a parties’ interests are affected by such measures. Section B of Article 
XVI focuses on export subsidies in particular, thereby providing for the general prin-
ciple that the use of subsidies on the export of primary products should be avoided, 
in view of preventing subsidies to result in a contracting party having more than an 
‘equitable share’ of world export trade in that particular product (Article XVI:3).107 The 
102 Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 263.
103 Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 considers a product to be introduced into the commerce of an importing country at 
less than its normal value, ‘if the price of the product exported from one country to another (a) is less than the comparable 
price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, (b), 
in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either (i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to 
any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or (ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus 
a reasonable addition for selling cost and profi t.’
104 Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 263.
105 See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, BISD 7S/60, adopted 
23 Oct. 1958, at para. 16.
106 See Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 263–264 with further references; see also Horlick/Quick/Vermulst, above 
n. 99, at 42–47.
107 The criterion ‘more than equitable share’ has been a disputed notion of the GATT system. For an overview, 
see Benitah, above n. 99, at 173–181 with reference to several cases adopted by the GATT Panel: GATT Panel Report, 
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mere  encouragement of notifi cation and consultation on the use of subsidies between 
Member States has not proven to be a very effective instrument to prevent  subsidization. 
Moreover, the distinction between primary and non-primary products in section B of 
the provision was interpreted as discriminating against developing countries, which con-
sequently did not endorse this section.108 Despite having received a separate regulation 
within the General Agreement, Article XVI has thus been assessed as having granted 
subsidies a rather rudimentary provision.109
4.2.2. Subsidies’ Regulation in the SCM Agreement
Efforts to address subsidization more effectively were undertaken and lead to a list of 
prohibited export subsidies in 1960. Furthermore, in light of the increased criticism 
against the US policies on countervailing duties, the US government decided to address 
the regulation of subsidies more generally during the Tokyo Round negotiations, a step 
that fi nally resulted in the 1979 Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Duties.110 This plurilateral agreement was particularly adopted by Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and a small number of 
advanced developing countries and expanded the existing GATT provisions  considerably. 
It adopted a two-track approach, by addressing unilateral responses to subsidies, on the 
one hand, and multilateral regulation of subsidies, on the other hand.111 In Article 11 of 
the Code, domestic subsidies were recognized as important and legitimate instruments 
and were thus permitted for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives. 
They could nevertheless be challenged if they caused (1) injury to the domestic indus-
try of another signatory, (2) nullifi cation or impairment of the benefi ts accruing to 
another signatory under the General Agreement, or (3) serious prejudice to the interests 
of another signatory. The challenge entailed a primary obligation of the complaining 
 signatory to consult with the subsidizing country. Unless a mutually acceptable  solution 
was achieved, a panel would be formed by the Committee on SCM, which could pro-
vide for specifi c recommendation to the parties. If such recommendations were not fol-
lowed, the Committee could authorize countermeasures.112
Despite such international efforts, subsidization remained a contentious issue on the 
international trade agenda and was thus taken up again during the Uruguay Round.113 
French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, BISD 7S/46, adopted 21 Nov. 1958; GATT Panel Report, European 
 Communities – Refunds on Exports of Sugar, BISD 26S/290, adopted 6 Nov. 1979; GATT Panel Report, European Communities – 
Refunds on Exports of Sugar Complaint by Brazil, BISD 27S/69, adopted 19 Nov. 1980; GATT Panel Report, European 
 Economic Community – Subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour, SCM/42, adopted 21 Mar. 1983.
108 Jackson, above n. 90, at 286; see Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 263–264 with further references.
109 Horlick/Quick/Vermulst, above n. 99, at 63–67 regarding domestic subsidies in particular.
110 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Arts VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (‘Subsidies Code’).
111 See Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 264–265 on the two-track approach; Jackson, above n. 90, at 288–290; 
Luengo Hernández de Madrid, above n. 99, at 63–74; see also Horlick/Quick/Vermulst, above n. 99, at 52–63.
112 See Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 266.
113 See Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 266.
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During these negotiation rounds, the Agreement on SCM Agreement114 was adopted, 
replacing the preceding legal situation by a comprehensive and rather detailed legal 
framework.
The SCM Agreement contains fi ve main parts: Part I encompasses general provi-
sions, thereby providing for a defi nition of the term ‘subsidy’ in its Article 1. Parts II, III, 
and IV of the SCM Agreement cover what is often referred to as the ‘red, green, yellow 
light’115 or the ‘traffi c light’116 approach. Accordingly, subsidies may distinguished into 
three broad categories, namely, a ‘prohibited (red)’, an ‘actionable (yellow)’, and a ‘non-
actionable (green)’ category. Prohibited subsidies encompass subsidies that are harmful to 
trade per se, whereas non-actionable subsidies receive ‘green light’ and are considered as 
being permitted.117 The third category of actionable subsidies may be challenged if their 
effects on international trade are considered harmful. Part V of the SCM Agreement 
addresses countervailing duty measures. Notably, the category of non-actionable (green) 
subsidies is, however, no longer applicable. According to Article 31, non-actionable sub-
sidies were limited to a period of fi ve years starting with the entry into force of the 
WTO, not least because developing countries were afraid that the green category would 
be excessively used by industrialized countries. Time will tell whether they will be put 
back into force according to current efforts on the international stage.118
With the establishment of the SCM Agreement, the institutionalization of a Com-
mittee on SCM was adopted from the Tokyo Code and was realized in Part VI of the 
SCM Agreement (Article 24.1). The Committee is composed of representatives from 
the Member States and establishes a permanent group of fi ve independent experts (the 
PGE), which can be requested to assist a panel and to elaborate advisory opinions on 
the existence and the nature of any subsidy (Article 24.3). Part VII of the SCM Agree-
ment addresses notifi cation and surveillance procedures with respect to subsidies; mem-
bers are obliged to notify subsidies annually to the Committee (Article 25). According to 
Article 26, the Committee is obliged to examine the notifi cations in regular surveillance. 
Part VIII of the SCM Agreement entails special and differential treatment provisions for devel-
oping country members, in light of the fact that subsidization may play an important role 
for the economic development programmes of such countries (Article 27.1).119 The SCM 
114 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), 15 Apr. 1994, 1867 UNTS 14, <www.
wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf> (visited 23 Jun. 2009).
115 Jackson, above n. 90, at 290.
116 Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 993.
117 Non-actionable subsidies could not be challenged under the SCM Agreement. However, in cases where a Mem-
ber State had reasons to believe that serious adverse effects were to be expected for the domestic industry, the member was 
allowed to request consultations, and if no mutually acceptable solution was reached, the Member could refer the matter 
to Subsidies Committee, which had the responsibility to immediately review the facts and the evidence of the effects. The 
Committee could then recommend modifi  cations to the subsidy programme in a way to remove the adverse effects. In 
cases where the recommendation was not followed within six months, the requesting member was authorized by the Com-
mittee to take appropriate countermeasures commensurate with the nature and degree of the effects determined to exist 
(see Art. 9 of the SCM Agreement).
118 Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 993.
119 For example, the regulations on prohibited subsidies are exempted from application to least-developed countries, 
whereas other developing countries are provided with an eight-year grace period to comply with these provisions (Art. 
27.4 of the SCM Agreement).
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 Agreement is then rounded off by Part IX on transitional arrangements, Part X covering 
Article 30 on dispute settlement, and Part XI with fi nal provisions, as well as seven Annexes.
4.2.3. Interim Conclusions
In light of the ongoing Doha Round negotiations, the basic concepts and principles 
of both Article VI of GATT 1994 and of the SCM Agreement have been confi rmed; 
 nevertheless, their clarifi cation and improvement are still envisaged.120 At the Doha Min-
isterial Conference, WTO members agreed to launch negotiations in the area of ‘WTO 
Rules’, that is, on the subject matter of (1) the Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of GATT 1994 (the so-called Anti-dumping Agreement), (2) the Agreement on SCM, 
and the WTO disciplines on fi sheries subsidies in particular, as well as (3) the WTO pro-
visions applying to regional trade agreements.121 New texts have been drafted in these 
specifi c fi elds to provide a common baseline for further discussions. However, in light 
of the diffi culties to achieve consensus, a lot of work still needs to be done in order to 
achieve a coherent and enhanced framework.122
For the time being, both the GATT provisions and the SCM Agreement seek to 
balance the need for redistribution and implementation of legitimate policy goals with 
free trade principles.123 The relationship between these legal frameworks was disputed. 
In the case of Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,124 the Appellate Body opined 
that GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement form an inseparable package of rights and 
disciplines that must be considered in conjunction. Such an interpretation also corre-
sponds to Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement, which clearly stipulates that ‘the agree-
ments and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereafter 
referred to as “Multilateral Trade Agreements”) are integral parts of this Agreement, 
binding all Members’; the SCM Agreement has been incorporated into Annex 1A on 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods of the WTO Agreement. In cases of con-
fl ict, the SCM Agreement supersedes the text of the GATT according to the general 
interpretative note included in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement125 and in light of 
the extensive and detailed provisions given by the SCM Agreement in terms of a lex 
specialis.126
120 WTO, Ministerial Declaration (2001), WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Ministerial Conference, Fourth 
 Session, Doha Declaration), at paras 28–29.
121 WTO, Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration (2005), WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Ministerial 
Conference, Sixth Session), at para. 28 and Annex D.
122 See, e.g., introductory statement to the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts 
of the AD and SCM Agreements, 19 Dec. 2008, WTO Doc TN/RL/W/236.
123 Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 990.
124 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 
21 Feb. 1997.
125 Ibid., 12–14, 17–18.
126 See also Grave, above n. 99, at 97; Horlick/Clarke, above n. 99, at 21.
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5.  Critical Assessment of the Support of the Automobile Industry Under the 
GATT and the SCM Agreement
5.1. Defi ning subsidies
A subsidy is deemed to exist under the SCM Agreement if the criteria under Article 1 
of the SCM Agreement are met.127 Accordingly, a subsidy is defi ned as ‘a fi nancial con-
tribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member’ or ‘any 
form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994’ that confers 
a benefi t.128 The meaning of ‘fi nancial contribution’ and ‘benefi t’ has been the subject of 
appeal in several WTO cases.129
According to the Agreement’s text, a ‘fi nancial contribution’ is provided (1) where a 
government practice involves a direct transfer of funds or potential direct transfers of funds 
or liabilities, (2) where a government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not col-
lected, (3) where a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure 
or purchases such goods, and (4) where a government makes payments to a funding mecha-
nism or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (1) to (3), which would normally be vested in the government and where the 
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally  followed by governments.130
The manifold cases of governmental support of the automobile industry within 
 different WTO Member States clearly amount to ‘fi nancial contributions’ in terms of Arti-
cle 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. The supporting measures adopted for the rescue 
of GM and Chrysler in the United States, for example, provided for direct transfers 
of funds, namely, of federal grants and loans, as well as considerable loan guarantees in 
light of attempts to promote research and innovation, that is, ‘potential direct transfers 
of funds or liabilities’ according to the terminology of the Agreement.131 Furthermore, 
governments  acquired preferred shares and thus directly transferred funds under the 
title of equity infusions; they have therefore become both acquirers and providers of 
127 See Grave, above n. 99, at 133 with further references. See also Id., above n. 99, at 124–257 on the subsidies’ 
conceptualization in general as well as on different forms of subsidies; see also Luengo Hernández de Madrid, above n. 
99, at 102–129. See also Gilbert Gangné & Franc ¸ois Roch, ‘The US-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute and the WTO 
definition of subsidy’, World Trade Review 7(2008): 547–572, at 556–568 on the approach taken in the Softwood lumber 
dispute in particular, which has influenced the present multilateral definition and continues to do so in the Doha round 
negotiations on subsidies.
128 In WTO Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 Mar. 2005, 
at paras 7.50–7.56, 7.351–7.356, the Panel took different factors into account for conceptualizing a ‘public body’, such as 
the importance of the mandate of government-appointed offi cials, e.g., as well governmental control. Government owner-
ship of 100% was seen as ‘highly relevant to and often determinative of government control.’
129 For a general overview, see Trebilcock/Howse, above n. 20, at 266–268; Cottier/Oesch, above n. 36, at 993–997.
130 See Art. 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. ‘Entrustment’ to a private body was explained by the AB as occurring 
where a government gives responsibility to a private body; ‘direction’ refers to situations of governmental exercise of its 
authority over a private body (see WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic 
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 27 Jun. 2005, at para. 116). In the 
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to certain Soft-
wood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 19 Jan. 2004, at paras 46–76 (herein after ‘ WTO Appellate Body 
Report, US-Softwood Lumber’), the Appellate Body held that the evaluation of the existence of a fi nancial contribution 
requires consideration of the nature of the transaction through which economic value is transferred by a state.
131 Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement.
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debtor-in-possession fi nancing.132 However, the governments’ interferences in the com-
panies’ policies and the composition of their management cannot be construed as a 
subsidy; these measures did not entail any fi nancial contributions, income, or price sup-
port and did not result in a benefi t in terms of the Agreement.133
The reduction of taxation as an incentive for both car buyers and car dealers may 
arguably be interpreted as the granting of ‘government revenue that is otherwise due’, 
which is foregone or not collected, in terms of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agree-
ment. The defi nition of such kinds of support was addressed by the Appellate Body par-
ticularly in the United States – Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations case,134 in which 
the Appellate Body interpreted the provision as implying that ‘less revenue has been raised 
by the government than would have been raised in a different situation, or, that is “other-
wise”. Moreover, the word “foregone” suggests that the government has given up an enti-
tlement to raise revenue that it could “otherwise” have raised’. The term ‘otherwise due’ 
was explained as entailing ‘some kind of comparison between the revenues due under the 
contested measures and revenue that would be due in some other situation’.135
According to the Appellate Body Report, the basis of comparison for tax incentives 
granted to car buyers would thus have to be the rules of taxation of the sovereign state in 
question. Consequently, if a glance at the state’s tax rules reveals that a particularly defi ned 
fee is owed to the state by car owners, for example, the exemption of this taxation as a 
means of incentive to buy cars could probably be interpreted as a fi nancial contribution 
in terms of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement clari-
fi es that in accordance with Article XVI of GATT 1994 and Annexes I through III of 
the SCM Agreement, the exemption of exported products from duties or taxes, which are 
usually borne by like products destined for domestic consumption, as well as the remis-
sion of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those that have accrued, are not 
deemed to be a subsidy. Tax incentives levied for the enhancement of car exports, for 
example, would thus not necessarily fall under the scope of the Agreement.136
Furthermore, price-supporting measures adopted to increase car exports or reduce 
car imports according to Article XVI of GATT 1994 would also be deemed ‘fi nancial 
contributions’ under Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement.
In addition to a ‘fi nancial contribution’, the defi nition of a subsidy presumes a 
 ‘benefi t’ in terms of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.137 Such a benefi t has been 
132 See GM Press Release, above n. 10; Simon, above n. 70.
133 See also Grave, above n. 99, at 250 et seq. Furthermore, ‘Cash for Clunkers’ programs (see above n. 85) and tax 
credits for car purchases do no qualify as subsides because they do no confer benefi ts to domestic fi rms (see Brunel & 
Hufbauer, above n. 16, at 3).
134 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, WT/DS108/AB/R, 
adopted 24 Feb. 2000.
135 Ibid., para. 90. See also paras 8.6–8.7.
136 On the interpretation of footnote 1 to the Agreement, see, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (hereinafter ‘WTO Appellate Body Report Canada-Autos’), WT/DS139/AB/R, 
WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 31 May 2000, where an import duty exemption, which was available to manufacturers of 
motor vehicles, was ruled as a prohibited subsidy in terms of Art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) and Art. 3.1(a) of the Agreement.
137 In WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 2 
Aug. 1999, at para. 157, the AB emphasized that the defi nitions of ‘fi nancial contribution’ and ‘benefi t’ should be distin-
guished ‘as two separate legal elements in Art. 1.1 of the SCM Agreement which together determine whether a subsidy exists’ 
[emphasis adopted from the original wording].
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found to exist when a fi nancial contribution is provided ‘on terms that are more advanta-
geous than those that would have been available to the recipient on the market’.138 In the 
Canada – Civilian Aircraft Case, the Panel referred to Article 14 of the SCM Agreement 
as providing for valuable guidelines for calculating ‘the benefi t to the recipient conferred 
pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1’, even though Article 14 applies in the context of 
Part V, that is, countervailing measures in response to subsidies granted, and expressly 
determines when an Article 1.1 ‘benefi t’ does not arise.139 The Appellate Body adopted 
this approach140 and added that ‘benefi ts’ do not exist in the abstract but must rely on 
the existence of a benefi ciary or a recipient, which can either be ‘a person, natural or 
legal, or a group of persons’.141
The subsidization of the automobile industry as such entails signifi cant implica-
tions for other industry branches, such as the suppliers of individual car parts, as well 
as metal, coating, or tyre producers, for example. From their perspective, the support 
of car producers ensures the purchasing power of their customers. Arguably, this could 
amount to an indirect subsidization of the car producers also according to Article VI:3 of 
GATT 1994, due to the fact that they are not forced to decrease the market prices for 
their products according to reduced demands but manage to sustain high prices with 
widespread effects.142
The supported auto industry enterprises and the auto suppliers arguably constitute 
the subsidy recipients for the purpose of our exemplary case. The governmental support of 
‘the auto industry’ as such may suffi ce to delineate the benefi ciaries in question. Accord-
ing to Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement, the granting of loans by a government can 
only be considered as conferring a benefi t, if there is a difference between the amount 
that the fi rm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the government and 
the amount that the fi rm would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the govern-
ment guarantee. The benefi t thus results from the difference between these two amounts 
adjusted for any differences in fees. Comparable guidelines are provided by Article 14(a) 
on the government provision of equity capital.
Against the background of the current economic crisis and resulting diffi culties for 
real economy branches, comparing the parameters of ‘the terms… that would have been 
138 This is often referred to as the ‘private investor test’ according to WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
 Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (hereinafter ‘WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-Aircraft’), WT/DS70/
AB/R, adopted 2 Aug. 1999, at para. 157. See also WTO Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft (hereinafter ‘WTO Panel Report, Canada-Aircraft’), WT/DS70/R, adopted 14 Apr. 1999, at para. 9.112. See also 
Benitah, above n. 99, at 90–91, interpreting this approach as being inspired by the simple view of ‘distortion’ of the natural 
market mechanisms within a national economy.
139 WTO Panel Report, Canada-Aircraft, above n. 138, at para. 9.113.
140 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-Aircraft, above n. 138, at para. 155.
141 Ibid., para. 154; see further attempts to frame the defi nition of ‘benefi t’ provided by Benitah, above n. 99, at 
214–218 with further references; see also Grave, above n. 99, at 170–189.
142 Indeed, the case law provided on ‘indirect subsidies’ did not specify an applicable defi nition. Nevertheless, it should 
be taken into account that indirect subsidies were usually considered in ‘reversed’ ‘upstream cases’. For example, in GATT 
Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, BISD/38S/30, adopted 11 
Jul. 1991, the subsidies paid to producers of swine were interpreted as amounting to an indirect subsidization of exported 
pork meat. See Benitah, above n. 99, at 269–272. See also the WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber, above 
n. 130, at paras 148–166, where the Appellate Body stated that before being entitled to impose countervailing duties, a state 
must assess whether the benefi t has been ‘passed through’. See Gagné & Roch, above n. 127, at 557–563.
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available to the recipient on the market’ and the terms provided in effect by the govern-
ments seems questionable and rather misleading due to the fact that comparable amounts 
of resources for the automobile industry would probably not have been available from pri-
vate investors over the general market. As a consequence, it has been alleged that the only 
thinkable ‘rescuer’ in the present context could have been the state. Furthermore, in light 
of the considerable government interventions into the existing markets, it could now be 
contended that it has become diffi cult if not almost impossible to determine a market value, 
based on an undistorted equilibrium between supply and demand in a free market.
A comparable argument was brought forward by the United States in the Canada – 
US Softwood Lumber Dispute,143 asserting that it was not possible to assess the adequacy of 
the remuneration on the basis of in-country prices, in light of the government’s complete 
domination of the stumpage market at issue. This fact was said to make it  impossible to 
use the small amount of private stumpage prices as a basis for any comparison. As a conse-
quence, the United States opined that the private market prices of timber were not refl ec-
tive of the ‘fair market value’ of timber in Canada.144 The Panel interpreted the text of 
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement as not in any way qualifying the market conditions as 
such that are to be used as a benchmark. According to the Panel’s decision, the legal text 
does not explicitly refer to a ‘pure’ market, a market ‘undistorted by government interven-
tion’. Moreover, the applicable paragraph (d) of Article 14 of the SCM Agreement identi-
fi es the market conditions that are to be used ‘to determine adequacy of remuneration 
as those which are prevailing’ in respect of the price of the good, its quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation, and other conditions of purchase or sale, in other words, the 
market conditions ‘as can be found’. The Panel thus acknowledged no justifi cation for 
disregarding the prevailing market prices on the grounds that they were distorted;145 the 
United States were found in violation of Article 14 by not using Canadian private prices 
in their benefi t calculations and in violation of Articles 10 and 32.1 for imposing counter-
vailing duties based on such calculations.146 The Appellate Body questioned these fi ndings 
of the Panel and fi nally reversed them, particularly in view of the arguments regarding 
market distortions and the resulting effects on the prices in question. It interpreted Article 
14(d) as permitting ‘investigating authorities to use a benchmark other than private prices 
in that market’ when private prices are distorted.147 The Appellate Body agreed that 
 alternative methods for determining the adequacy of remuneration in accordance with 
Article 14 ‘could include proxies that take into account prices for similar goods quoted 
on world markets, or proxies constructed on the basis of production costs.’ However, it did 
not suggest alternative procedures for determining private prices and thus did not make 
any fi ndings on the WTO consistency of any of these methods in the abstract.148
143 WTO Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada (hereinafter ‘WTO Panel Report, US-Softwood Lumber’), WT/DS257/R, adopted 29 Aug. 2003;  WTO Appel-
late Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber, above n. 130.
144 WTO Panel Report, US-Softwood Lumber, above n. 143, at para. 7.44.
145 Ibid., para. 7.51.
146 Ibid., para. 7.65.
147 WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber, above n. 130, at paras 100–103.
148 Ibid., para. 106. See also Gagné & Roch, above n. 127, at 555–557.
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Although an undistorted market value is very diffi cult to attain given the present 
developments, it would be rather complicated to fi nd another benchmark applicable 
in the current context of governmental market interventions. Nevertheless, it can be 
assumed that the governments’ fi nancial contributions were conceded on  comparably 
benefi cial terms regarding the fi xed duration of the loans and the agreed interest rates, 
due to the governmental participation’s extraordinary basis in light of an assumed case of 
emergency, making economic market considerations recede behind the priority objective 
of supporting the specifi c industry branches. Indeed, the interest rate on US loans of 5% 
exceeds London Interbank Loan offered Rate (LIBOR) by 3%.
As a consequence, and without overruling the considerations that remain neces-
sary on a case-by-case basis, it seems appropriate to address the fi nancial contributions 
granted to the automobile industry in light of the economic crisis as amounting to 
benefi ts and thus constituting subsidies under the SCM Agreement.
5.2. Specifi city under the SCM agreement
In order for a subsidy to be prohibited under Part II, actionable under Part III or sub-
jected to countervailing measures under Part V of the SCM Agreement, the subsidy in 
question has to be ‘specifi c’ in accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement.149
‘Specifi c subsidies’ according to the Agreement means that the subsidy has to be ‘spe-
cifi c to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries’ within the jurisdic-
tion of the granting authorities. Thereby the limitation of subsidies ‘to certain enterprises 
located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority’150 is deemed to suffi ce for the purpose of the Agreement. However, even in such 
cases, a subsidy will not be considered ‘specifi c’ if the granting authority or the legislation 
pursuant to which the granting authority operates establishes objective criteria or condi-
tions governing the eligibility for and the amount of a subsidy.151 According to footnote 
2 of the Agreement, objective criteria or conditions are  interpreted as meaning criteria or 
conditions that are neutral (due to the fact that they do not favour certain enterprises over 
others) and that are economic in nature and apply horizontally. The Agreement names the 
number of employees or the size of the enterprise as examples for such non-specifi c criteria 
and conditions. These have to be clearly spelled out in a law, a regulation, or another offi cial 
document, so as to be capable of verifi cation and for the purpose of falling under Article 
2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. Notwithstanding any non-specifi city according to the previ-
ous examination, Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement rounds off the provision, by stipulat-
ing that if there are reasons to believe that the subsidy is in fact specifi c, other factors can be 
considered. Such factors may be the ‘use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of 
certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportion-
149 Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement. See also Grave, above n. 99, at 189–210 and Luengo Hernández de Madrid, 
above n. 99, at 129–142 with an overview on the specifi city criterion.
150 Article 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
151 Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
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ately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion 
has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.’152
The policy arguments supporting such a specifi city test can be distinguished into 
two main approaches, based on what is deemed a ‘distortion’ in international trade.153
First, seen from an economic angle, it seems that subsidies provided ‘across the board 
to all of society and all of the producing sectors of society’ do generally not distort the 
markets; if they do, their distorting effects may normally be considered as quite mini-
mal.154 On the contrary, specifi c subsidies are perceived as ‘distorting’ due to their impact 
on the production costs of fi rms having selectively received a subsidy. This leads to:
[A]rtifi cial overproduction of subsidized products compared to what these fi rms would have cho-
sen to produce, if the price of subsidized products had been able to refl ect their real cost of pro-
duction.(…) At the same moment [there is] in that economy an underproduction of other prod-
ucts more valuable socially, due to the fact that scarce productive resources have been artifi cially 
drained towards the manufacture of subsidized goods.155
In other words, the ‘unfairness’ of the subsidies is traced back to the distortion of natural 
comparative advantages between countries.156
Second, narrowing the focus on actionable subsidies by means of presupposing their 
specifi city may provide for a useful tool of administration to omit general activities that 
all governments undertake, including societal infrastructure such as police, roads, schools, 
and so forth from a countervailing duty process.157
If the fi nancial support of the automobile industry is not conferred to specifi c enter-
prises such as GM and Chrysler in the US but is granted to the ‘automobile industry’ as 
such, the question arises whether this would provide for suffi cient specifi city, particularly 
in view of the wide fi eld encompassed by this market branch, which affects different 
subsectors such as markets for tyres, metals, motors, paint, etc.158 For example, if the EU 
would decide to fi nancially support the automobile industry as such on a regional level 
and the benefi ts were granted based on objective criteria or conditions, clearly spelled out 
in law and based on economic considerations, and if they were applicable horizontally, 
Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement would have to be distinguished from paragraph 
(c) of the same provision. For the time being, the EU has indeed focused on outlining 
guidelines to support the automobile sector,159 thereby leaving actual implementation 
to the Member States on a national level. In view of the de facto factors addressed by 
Article 2.1(c), which already accept the predominant use of a subsidy programme by 
152 Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement.
153 On different views of ‘distortion’ see Benitah, above n. 99, at 252–280.
154 Jackson, above n. 90, at 296–297; see also Grave, above n. 99, at 193–194, with a more critical approach, argu-
ing that distortions of competition also occur when industry branches as such are subsidized, thereby referring to the fi rst 
sentence of Art. 2.1 of the SCM Agreement.
155 Benitah, above n. 99, at 89–90.
156 Ibid., 68.
157 Jackson, above n. 90, at 297.
158 See Jackson, above n. 90, at 298 with corresponding concerns regarding the agricultural sector and suggesting 
a ‘distortion test’ for constraining the breadth of a subsidy defi nition with a focus on whether a subsidy actually distorts 
economic activity compared with ‘free market conditions’.
159 For example, with the adoption of the Communication from the Commission – Responding to the crisis in the 
European automotive industry, above n. 59.
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certain enterprises as providing for suffi cient reasons to believe that a subsidy is specifi c, 
cases of non-specifi city according to Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement will arguably, 
however, remain the exception. In the present discussions, the fi nancial benefi ts that hit 
the headlines were granted to individual enterprises; their specifi city can be assumed.
5.3. Prohibited subsidies
Prohibited non-agricultural subsidies according to Article 3 of the SCM Agreement 
exist, where (1) subsidies are contingent, in law or in fact – whether solely or as one of 
several other conditions, upon export performance – including such cases as illustrated in 
Annex I, and where (2) subsidies are contingent upon the use of domestic over imported 
goods. 
Both categories of subsidies entail distortions of competition, their specifi city is thus 
perceived as a legal consequence of the classifi cation as a prohibited subsidy, not as their 
prerequisite.160 Annex I contains the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, which provides 
for valuable guidance for assessing prohibited export subsidies.161 Footnote 4 provides 
for the explanatory reasoning that contingency ‘in fact’ on export performance is met in 
cases where subsidies are ‘tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings’. 
The explanatory note continues by stating that ‘the mere fact that a subsidy is granted 
to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an 
export subsidy within the meaning of this provision’. The distinction between de facto 
and de jure contingency was particularly tackled in the Canada-Aircraft Case, in which 
the Appellate Body generally stated that the contingency expressed within the provision 
must be the same for both de facto and de jure contingency.162 However, the evidence 
used for proving each differs considerably. While de jure contingency is demonstrated on 
the basis of the text of the applicable legal instrument, proving de facto export contin-
gency will generally be a more complex undertaking.163 
The second paragraph of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement addresses domestic con-
tent subsidies, that is, subsidies that aim at reducing imports of products from other 
countries and thereby favour domestic production.164
The real economy support in light of the fi nancial deteriorations with the main 
objective of stabilizing the economy branches is not prohibited as such. Moreover, a 
particular leeway exists for establishing fi nancial benefi ts under Article 3 of the SCM 
160 See Grave, above n. 99, at 209–210 with further references; see also Horlick/Clarke, above n. 99, at 25–26.
161 On the relationship between Art. 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and the Illustrative List see Dominic Coppens, 
‘How Much Credit for Export Credit Support under the SCM Agreement?’, Journal of International Economic Law 12 (2009): 
63–113, at 91–97.
162 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-Aircraft, above n. 138, at paras 167–173; see also WTO Appellate Body 
Report, Canada-Autos, above n. 136.
163 Ibid., para. 167; on the ‘in fact tied’ criterion, see also Benitah, above n. 99, at 190–198; see Luengo Hernández 
de Madrid, above n. 99, at 144–148 on the distinction between de jure and de facto contingency and at 142–158 with an 
overview over prohibited subsidies.
164 By addressing both domestic and export subsidies under the same provision, the SCM Agreement has abandoned 
the contentious distinction between the two types of subsidies adopted under Art. XVI of the GATT in particular. (See 
Luengo Hernández de Madrid, above n. 99, at 47 et seq. and at 154–155; Horlick/Quick/Vermulst, above n. 99, at 42–50; 
Grave, above n. 99, at 66 et seq., 84–87, and 128–129.)
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Agreement. As long as the subsidies provided are not made contingent upon high export 
performances of a particular enterprise or industry or upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods – for example, within the production process, which would eventually 
result in a better treatment of the domestic industries – they are generally not prohibited 
under the SCM framework. In light of these fi ndings, the so-called Buy American clause 
incorporated into the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 regarding 
funds for the support of the iron and steel industry165 could turn out to be problematic; 
it stipulates that the funds made available by the US government can only be used ‘for 
a project for the construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or 
public work unless all of the iron and steel used in the project is produced in the United 
States’. The tensions such a clause could provoke has been acknowledged, leading to an 
adjustment of the provision to state that the clause:
shall not apply in any case or category of cases in which the head of the Federal department or 
agency involved fi nds that (1) applying subsection (a) [the clause] would be inconsistent with 
the public interest; (2) iron, steel, and the relevant manufactured goods are not produced in the 
United States in suffi cient and reasonably available quantities and of a satisfactory quality; or 
(3) the inclusion of iron, steel, and manufactured goods produced in the United States will increase 
the cost of the overall project my more than 25 percent.
Most notably, it is held that ‘this section shall be applied in a manner consistent with 
United States obligations under international agreements’. Similar concerns have been 
raised with regard to France’s announcement of making aid to the automative sector 
conditional on automakers’ maintaining their production on French grounds and pur-
chasing certain parts from French suppliers, as well as forestalling the export of jobs to 
other countries, such measures would violate EU rules, however, France has committed 
to avoid any breaches of Internal Market Principles.166 It remains to be seen how such 
clauses can be applied in conformity with the WTO legal framework.
5.4. Actionable subsidies
Actionable subsidies are regulated in Part III of the SCM Agreement. Exempted from 
the actionable subsidies’ scope of application are the subsidies maintained on  agricultural 
products according to Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Apart from this 
exception, subsidies are framed as addressing specifi c forms of government assistance 
to fi rms or industries and are objectionable if adverse effects to the interests of other 
members are caused. Such adverse effects may consist in (1) the injury to the domestic 
industry of another member; (2) the nullifi cation or impairment of benefi ts accruing 
165 It held ‘for a project for the construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public work 
unless all of the iron and steel used in the project is produced in the United States’ (s. 1605 of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, HR1).
166  See Brunel & Hufbauer, above n.16, at 5, 8. See also EU Presse Release, State aids: the Commission obtains guaran-
tees from the French governments on the absence of protectionist measures in the French plan for aid to the automotive sector, 
Brussles, 28 Feb. 2009, MEMO/09/90; Report from the Commission – State Aid Scoreboard, Spring 2009 update, Special 
Edition on State Aid Interventions in the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, 8 Apr. 2009, COM(2009) 164, at 26. 
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directly or indirectly to other members under the GATT 1994, including the benefi ts 
of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; or (3) in the serious prejudice to 
the interests of another member.167
In the present situation of governmental support granted to the automobile indus-
try, adverse effects resulting either from material injury to the domestic industry of another 
Member (Article 5[a]) or serious prejudice to the interests of another Member (Article 5[c]) are 
potentially given and will be further examined.
5.4.1. Defi ning the Market: Like Products
As a starting point for assessing cases of actionable subsidies, the preliminary and funda-
mental question needs to be addressed, which ‘like products’ shall be compared. According 
to footnote 46 of the SCM Agreement, the term ‘like product’ is interpreted as meaning 
‘a product which is identical, that is, alike in all respects to the product under consider-
ation, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in 
all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consider-
ation’. Although the term ‘like product’ is used in a variety of contexts within the WTO 
Agreement, the SCM Agreement adopts its own defi nition of the term.168 Framing the 
comparable products and their markets and thus the industry in question is of central 
importance for taking the second step of identifying cases of material injury or serious 
prejudice. Indeed, ‘the more narrowly the domestic market is defi ned, the greater the 
likelihood of an affi rmative injury fi nding’.169
As a consequence of this contribution’s focus on the ‘automobile industry’, the 
products subject to further assessment are ‘automobiles’. This term covers different vehi-
cles and therewith raises the question whether such automobiles, after all produced for 
different customers, should be compared as like products. If no identical products are at 
hand, a wide range of criteria may help assess which automobiles have ‘characteristics 
closely resembling’ one another. These include the physical characteristics of the vehicles 
in question, such as their size, weight, height, engine size and capacity, safety features, and 
so forth, as well as other factors such as the automobiles’ brands, their image/reputation, 
status and resale values, their price and tariff classifi cation, as well as their end-use.170 
Furthermore, helpful inputs may be provided by the market segmentation adopted by 
the automotive industry itself, an approach adopted by the Panel in Indonesia – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry.171 Indeed, passenger cars are generally highly 
differentiated products; depending on the compared objects, huge price differences may 
167 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.
168 WTO Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (hereinafter ‘WTO Panel Report, 
Indonesia-Autos’), WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, adopted 2 Jul. 1998,  at para. 14.170.
169 Bruce M. Steen, ‘Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative Approach to Defi ning “Like Product” and 
“Domestic Industry” under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979’, Virginia Law Review 73 (1987): 1459–1499, at 1470.
170 WTO Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, above n.168, at paras 14.165–14.173. In this case, the Panel held that the 
defi nition of ‘like products’ given in footnote 46 of the SCM Agreement does not preclude the analysis of other criteria 
other than physical characteristics (Id., at para. 14.173).
171 WTO Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, above n. 168, at paras 14.177–14.193.
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exist between brands and models resulting in rather low degrees of substitutability. Par-
ticularly in light of the governments’ tendency to promote ‘green’ industry developments, 
the question arises whether fuel-effi cient cars are ‘like’ large sport utility vehicles (SUV) 
or whether a distinction should be made, resulting, for example, in the increased support 
of green cars over others. If ‘automobiles’ are perceived widely as motor-driven vehicles 
for land use that do not cover rail vehicles, it seems clear that both ‘green’ and polluting 
cars would be encompassed. Convincing arguments can be invoked in favour of such an 
approach. Due to the fact that particularly the US government’s support is supposed to 
benefi t former producers of SUVs in order to provide for incentives for their change of 
thinking as potent automobile suppliers, a distinction between the same producers’ goods 
based on environmental considerations could be perceived as rather artifi cial.172 Never-
theless and despite such theoretical observations, an effective assessment and comparison 
can only be made on a case-by-case basis, whereby the analysis of ‘like products’ under 
other WTO law provisions can provide for valuable guidance.173
5.4.2. Injury to the Domestic Industry
5.4.2.1. Defi ning material injuries
‘Injury to the domestic industry’ is interpreted according to Part V of the SCM Agree-
ment, that is, Article 15 in particular,174 and can also be read in the light of Article VI of 
GATT 1994.175 Footnote 45 defi nes ‘injury’ as meaning ‘material injury to a domestic 
industry, threat of material industry or material retardation of the establishment of such 
an industry’. The term shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Article 
15 of the SCM Agreement. Thereby, a threat of material injury is to be based on facts 
‘and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility’. Furthermore, the change 
in circumstances that is deemed to create such an injuring situation ‘must be clearly 
foreseen and imminent’. The investigating authorities are held to consider inter alia such 
factors as the nature of the subsidy, a signifi cant rate of increase of subsidized imports, 
or the prices of the imports in question, ‘in making a determination  regarding the exis-
tence of a threat of material injury’.176 According to Article 15.1 of the SCM Agree-
ment, positive evidence is required for determining injury, which includes an objective 
examination of two criteria, namely, (1) the volume of the subsidization and the effect of 
the subsidized products on prices in the other member’s market for like products and (2) 
the consequent impact of these subsidizations on the other member’s producers of such 
172 See also WTO Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, above n. 168, at paras 14.140–14.193.
173 WTO Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, above n. 168, at para. 14.174.
174 Footnote 11 of the SCM Agreement.
175 Article VI:6(a) of GATT 1994 stipulates that: ‘No contracting party shall levy any (…) countervailing duty on 
the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the (…) 
 subsidization (…) is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry or is such as to retard 
materially the establishment of a domestic industry.’
176 Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement.
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products.177 The investigating authorities are thus held to consider whether there has 
been a signifi cant increase in subsidization, in absolute or relative terms, that is, relative 
to the production or consumption in the other Member State. A strong effect is deemed 
to exist where there has been a signifi cant price  undercutting by the subsidization as 
compared with the price of a like product experiencing no  governmental support.178 
Furthermore, the examination of the impact of the subsidies in question on the industry 
producing like products, includes:
an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the State of the 
industry, including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profi ts, productiv-
ity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and 
potential negative effects on cash fl ow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise 
capital or investments’ etc.179
A precise technical defi nition of the concept of ‘injury’ is thus not provided by the SCM 
Agreement, which relies on a list of elements that should be examined in an objec-
tive manner for establishing ‘injury’ on a case-by-case basis. Investigating authorities are 
therefore rather free to evaluate the relative weight of each element in a given case.180
5.4.2.2. Causality between subsidy and injury
A particular diffi culty arises from the necessity to demonstrate that the subsidies in 
 question cause the injuries, thus that a causal relationship between the subsidies and the 
injury exists. This prerequisite results from the wording of Article VI of GATT 1994, 
as well as Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.181 Accordingly, the causal relationship is 
based on the national authorities’ examination of all relevant evidence and any other fac-
tors (that is, other than the subsidized imports) that may cause material injuries to the 
domestic industries. These are, inter alia, the volume and prices of non-subsidized imports 
of the same product in question, contraction in demand or changes to the patterns of 
consumption, trade restrictive practices and competition between the foreign and the 
domestic producers, development in technology, and the export performance and pro-
ductivity of the domestic industry. According to the Panel’s interpretation of this second 
sentence in the Panel on Canadian Countervailing Duties on Grain Corn from the United 
States case,182 assuming causality between a subsidy and an injury was to be avoided in 
177 See Art. 15.2 of the SCM Agreement, which, in its original wording, refers to subsidized imports due to its 
 primary application on countervailing duties, which are imposed on products stemming from the territory of a Member 
State and are imported into the territory of another.
178 See Art. 15.2 of the SCM Agreement. See also for further valuable inputs Art. VI:1 of GATT 1994 for the evalu-
ation of below-normal value pricing.
179 Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement.
180 Benitah, above n. 99, at 14 with particular reference to Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Johanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies 
in International Trade (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics/Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 
at 24 on Art. 6:3 of the Tokyo Subsidies Code.
181 See also Art. 15.1 of the SCM Agreement referring to the GATT provision, Art. 15.2 and Art. 15.4 of the SCM 
Agreement.
182 GATT Panel Report, Panel on Canadian Countervailing Duties on Grain Corn from the United States, BISD 39S/411, 
adopted by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on 26 Mar. 1992.
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cases where all the appearances of an injury seemed to be caused by a subsidized import, 
however, where in actual fact, the real and exclusive cause was related to factors other 
than subsidies. In this case where a dramatic decline in world market prices for grain 
corn occurred, the Panel reasoned that producers would have been affected even in the 
absence of subsidized imports.183
The necessity to prove a causal relationship between the subsidy and the injury has 
been criticized as resulting in a legally indeterminate text. With Article 15.5 of the SCM 
Agreement’s reference to Articles 15.2 and 15.4 according to footnote 47, the causal 
requirement was interpreted as becoming redundant, due to the fact that the determina-
tion of the existence of an injury, according to a text-based interpretation of paragraphs 
2 and 4 of the provision, ‘is at the same time a demonstration of the causal relationship 
between the subsidized imports and the injury, through the effects of the subsidies’.184 
Linked to this fi nding is the related question whether ‘the effects of the subsidized 
imports’ and ‘the effects of the subsidy’ are equivalent.185 However, based on a more 
teleological interpretation of Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement and by stretching the 
literal meaning of footnote 47, it is possible to interpret the provision as examining the 
factors mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4 and thus considering the effects of the subsidy 
for the interpretation of causality; references to the effects do not guarantee the fulfi l-
ment of the obligation in the fi rst sentence of Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.186
For the purpose of assessing the subsidization of the auto industry, different 
aspects should be considered for scrutinizing a causal relationship between the subsidy 
and the alleged injury at hand. The substantial amounts of governmental sources that 
have been granted to the automobile sector arguably result in considerable effects that 
such subsidization may have regarding imports and prices of automobiles. According 
to Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement, the current economic crisis also needs due 
consideration. Indeed, the support of the automobile industry has been undertaken in 
times in which market distortions seem to accompany the deteriorations as a rather 
common feature and the demand-side of auto-buyers is naturally decreasing due to 
financial losses; the volumes and prices for automobiles are adjusted in a corresponding 
downwards manner. It is only in light of such findings that a fairly adequate picture 
can be framed and the question can be answered on a case-by-case basis whether, 
according to an ordinary run of events, a corresponding subsidy would have lead to 
an according injury.
183 Ibid., para. 5.2.9; see also Benitah, above n. 99, at 287. In other words, the subsidy in question was not a ‘conditio 
sine qua non’ and thus not a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of the injury that would otherwise not have come 
to effect.
184 Benitah, above n. 99, at 283–284; for a more general overview, see Id., at  281–304.
185 See Benitah, above n. 99, at 300–304, focusing particularly on the case of GATT Panel Report, United States – 
Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, SCM/153, adopted by the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on 28 Apr. 1994.
186 See also Benitah, above n. 99, at 285–286 with further references.
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5.4.3. Serious Prejudice to the Interests of Another State
5.4.3.1. Framing cases of serious prejudice
Actionability of the subsidies in question may also derive from cases where the adverse 
effects caused consist in serious prejudice to the interests of another member (Article 5[c] 
of the SCM Agreement). Article 6 of the SCM Agreement particularly explains the 
notion of ‘serious prejudice’, which is only assumed the subsidy has resulted in an effect 
listed in paragraph 3 to the provision.187 This is the case if either one or several of the 
following situations apply:
(1) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product 
of another member into the market of the subsidizing member;
(2) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product 
of another member from a third country market;
(3) the effect of the subsidy is a signifi cant price undercutting by the subsidized 
product as compared with the price of a like product of another member in 
the same market or signifi cant price suppression, price depression or lost sales 
in the same market;
(4) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the 
subsidizing member in a particular subsidized primary product or commod-
ity as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of 
three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a period when 
 subsidies have been granted.188
Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement elucidates that the displacement or impediment of 
exports includes any cases in which it can be demonstrated that a change in relative shares 
of the market has resulted as a disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product. This may be 
the case if there is an increase in the market share of the subsidized product, if the  market 
share of the subsidized product remains constant although circumstances exist according to 
which the shares would have declined in the absence of the subsidy, as well as if the market 
share drops but at a slower rate than would have been the case without the subsidy. Such 
developments are examined over a representative period of time that is deemed suffi cient 
to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the  concerned product  market, that is, 
‘in normal circumstances’, at least one year. Article 6.5 of the SCM Agreement annotates 
that a price undercutting in terms of paragraph 3(c) is assessed by means of comparing the 
prices of the subsidized product with prices of non-subsidized like products supplied to the 
same market. If a direct comparison is not possible, export unit values may be examined 
to demonstrate the existence of such price undercutting.189
187 See Art. 6.2 of the SCM Agreement.
188 Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added).
189 See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 2 Jun. 2008, at para. 368, in which the Appellate Body accepted the Panel’s 
‘but for’ approach, which it understood as requiring that price suppression be the effect of the subsidies at issue and that 
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Article 6.7 of the SCM Agreement establishes particular exceptions to the presump-
tion of a displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice. This may be the case 
where the complaining member has adopted similar measures, for example, resulting in a 
prohibition or restriction on exports of the like products, as well as in the event of natu-
ral disasters, strikes, transport disruptions, or other ‘force majeure’, which substantially 
affect the product’s production, qualities, quantities, or prices. In such cases, the adverse 
effects to the interests of the complaining member do not seem to be established.
For the purpose of this examination, the question whether the governmental sup-
port provided to the automobile sector results in one or various of the effects as listed 
in Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement should particularly focus on whether a change 
in relative market shares can be observed, whether prices are undercut, or whether an 
increase in the world market share of the subsidizing member can be assessed. In the 
current situation, it is important to take into account the potent market power and the 
global market shares that the affected automobile producers have gained over the years. 
GM, Ford, and Chrysler have often been referred to as the ‘Big Three’. In this position, 
the most powerful automobile producers already had a substantial impact on the price 
determination without governmental support. The  challenge would thus be to examine 
the government’s effect in particular. Furthermore, the  question would have to be tackled 
which period of time should be examined to demonstrate the trends at issue. While 
Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement asks for a minimal period of at least one year ‘in 
normal circumstances’, solid arguments would probably opt for a different representa-
tive time period in light of the exceptional situation as is currently experienced. In 
light of such considerations, the distinction between short-termed and long-termed 
governmental measures has to be taken into account. This is also the case in view of 
Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement listing four cases where serious prejudice is deemed 
to exist. Although this provision is no longer applicable, it is interpreted as nonetheless 
providing for some guidance for the understanding of the original architecture of the 
Agreement190 and shall thus be adopted accordingly.
Regarding the current measures supporting the automobile sector, particularly two 
cases of serious prejudice can be distinguished: on the one hand, subsidies have been 
granted to cover operating losses sustained by the particular industries in the  automobile 
sector (Article 6.1[b]), on the other hand, subsidies have also been granted to cover 
losses sustained by individual enterprises (Article 6.1[c]). This distinction is important, 
because subsidies towards enterprises may be justifi ed in cases in which they are deemed 
to result in ‘one-time measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that 
there be a ‘genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect’ between the subsidies in question and the price sup-
pression. See also WTO Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, above n. 168, at paras 14.237–14.257 with an analysis of Art. 6.3(c) 
of the SCM Agreement.
190 WTO Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, Recourse to Arbitration 
by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB, adopted 30 Aug. 
2002, at para. 56; see also WTO Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, adopted 8 Sep. 
2004, at paras 1086 and 1292.
 GOVERNMENTS’ INTERVENTIONS INTO THE REAL ECONOMY 1007
enterprise and which are given merely to provide time for the development of long-term 
solutions and to avoid acute social problems.’191
Accordingly, a differentiation between ‘industry’ and ‘enterprises’, on the one hand, 
and between non-recurrent one-time measures for exceptional situations and long-
term support, on the other hand, is necessary and may provide for some leeway for 
 governmental arguments in favour of subsidizing instruments. The conceptual distinction 
between ‘industry’ and ‘enterprises’ recurs in different articles of the SCM Agreement, 
such as Article 2.1 regarding the subsidy’s specifi city. Furthermore, Article 16.1 of the 
SCM Agreement defi nes the term ‘domestic industry:’
as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose 
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production 
of those products, except that when products are related to the exporters or importers or are 
themselves importers of the allegedly subsidized product or a like product from other countries, 
the term “domestic industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers.192
Generally speaking, however, there does not exist any rigorous defi nition in  international 
texts; some guidance could be deduced from application of the simple view of  ‘distortion’, 
standing at the core of the rationale for subsidies’ regulations.193 Furthermore, from a 
literal approach, ‘industry’ can be interpreted as the more extensive term, consisting of 
different individual enterprises.
As a consequence, the compatibility of governmental measures not least depends 
on whether the whole automobile industry is supported or whether the state measures 
concentrate on individual enterprises. In the former case, a serious prejudice is deemed 
to exist from the outset. In the latter case, the SCM Agreement does not prohibit one-
time measures to prevent the worst. Such an interpretation deriving from Article 6.1 of 
the SCM Agreement may also infl uence the perception of the rest of the Agreement and 
could thus lead to a milder evaluation of the effects of state support in terms of Article 
6.3. However, precaution is appropriate according to the terminology used in Article 6.2 
of the SCM Agreement, which clearly requires an examination of both Article 6.1 and 
Article 6.3 as cumulative criteria necessary for an assessment of serious prejudice.
5.4.3.2. Justifi cation
The last step in the examination of whether ‘serious prejudice’ prevails in principle is the 
assessment of circumstances referred to in Article 6.7 of the SCM Agreement. Indeed, a 
justifi cation on grounds of ‘force majeure’ could seem to provide for a hinging point in 
this context at fi rst glance. However, according to a systematical reading, it would proba-
bly be diffi cult to list the man-made economic crisis in line with ‘natural disasters, strikes 
and transport disruptions’ according to Article 6.7(c) of the Agreement. Furthermore, in 
191 Article 6.1(c) of the SCM Agreement, second part of the sentence.
192 Reference to Art. 16 for the interpretation of the term ‘industry’ in Art. 2.1 of the SCM Agreement was, however, 
rejected by the Panel in the WTO Panel Report, US-Softwood Lumber, above n. 130, at para. 184. See also Luengo Hernán-
dez de Madrid, above n. 99, at 132–137 with further references.
193 Benitah, above n. 99, at 275–279.
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light of the global impact of the crisis and the resulting measures adopted worldwide, a 
supporting state could take the view that a possible complaining member is involved in 
similar protective measures, resulting in the fact that serious prejudice is not caused in 
terms of the circumstances listed in Article 6.7 of the SCM Agreement. According to the 
general principles applicable regarding the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlements, 
which comply with the generally accepted rule of evidence in civil law, common law, 
and most national jurisdictions, it is required that the party complaining or defending 
asserts the affi rmative of a particular claim or defence.194 As a consequence, the support-
ing state would have to defend itself by proving that the complaining party itself was 
adopting similarly subsidizing measures.
Arguments in favour of the various governmental measures bolstering research and 
‘smart’ innovation in the fi elds of low-carbon markets, clean technologies, and energy effi -
ciency in general could be derived from a glance at the no longer applicable Articles 8 and 
9 of the SCM Agreement on non-actionable subsidies. Article 8.2(a) classifi es assistance for 
research activities conducted by fi rms or by higher education or research establishments as 
non-actionable if the assistance covers no more than 75% of the costs of industrial research 
and 50% of the costs of pre-competitive development activity, respectively, and provided 
that such assistance is limited to specifi c costs.195 Furthermore, Article 8.2(c) addresses 
‘assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements 
imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and fi nancial burden 
on fi rms’. Such support is apt to justify a corresponding subsidy provided that it complies 
with four cumulative criteria, namely, that the assistance:
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and (ii) is limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation; and 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully 
borne by fi rms; and (iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a fi rm’s planned reduction of 
nuisances and pollution and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; 
and (iv) is available to all fi rms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes.
Sustainment helping to prevent environmental degradation can also be interpreted as a 
response to already existing imperfections of market signals where environmental costs 
are not considered as costs in the balance sheet and thus the products’ prices.
Since the legal situation is not perfectly clear, due to the fact that the  members of 
the Agreement were not willing to extend the provisions on non-actionable subsidies 
according to Article 31 of the SCM Agreement and dispute settlement has not pro-
vided much case law regarding these provisions,196 a defi nitive assessment of whether 
state incentives in favour of green developments are compatible under WTO law is 
194 See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 25 Apr. 1997, at 14–17.
195 For example, costs of personnel, costs of instruments, costs of consultancy, additional overhead costs, or costs of 
materials, supplies, etc.
196 At least in WTO Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/RW, adopted 9 May 2000, at para. 5.24, by assessing whether a de facto export contin-
gency existed in respect of the Canadian regional aircraft industry support, the Panel referred to ns 28 and 29 to former 
Art. 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement for interpreting whether the fact that the results of a project may in the future be useful 
in the development of new products or their improvement would render a project ‘near-market’.
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not possible. Although bringing a case to the WTO based on environmental measures 
could cause political concerns, the nature of these types of justifi ed subsidies should not 
be  overestimated.197 However, a margin for argumentation exists according to which a 
 one-time,  non- recurring supportive measure, complying with the cumulative criteria 
listed in Article 8.2(c), would not amount to a breach of the SCM Agreement.
5.5. Concluding remarks
As a general rule, subsidies shall be notifi ed to the contracting parties according to 
Part VII and Article 25 of the SCM Agreement and Article XVI:1 of GATT 1994. 
 Furthermore, if the granting of fi nancial contributions amounts to adverse effects on 
the interests of other parties to the SCM Agreement, consisting in an injury or serious 
prejudice to their domestic industry, the implementation of a dispute resolution process 
cannot be excluded.198 However, due to the substantial and widespread impacts that the 
economic crisis had on the real economy of various countries, it is rather implausible 
that consultation procedures would be fi led in the very near future, not least in view of 
possible justifi cations under Article 6.7 of the SCM Agreement. Furthermore, in view 
of the auto industry’s characterization by numerous cross-ownerships among companies, 
countervailing duty cases are also improbable. Such fi ndings have lead to concerns that 
the auto industry could remove itself from the WTO regime, thus weakening the world 
trade system.
Additionally, according to Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the SCM 
 Agreement, countervailing duties may generally be imposed on the products from the 
subsidizing country, pursuant to the initiation of investigations to determine the exis-
tence, degree, and effect of any alleged subsidy according to Article 11 of the SCM 
Agreement. The term ‘countervailing duty’ is defi ned as meaning ‘a special duty lev-
ied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the 
manufacture, production or export of any merchandize, as provided for in paragraph 3 of 
Article VI of GATT 1994’. Countervailing measures are thus implemented by the states 
as a reaction to adverse effects stemming from governmental interventions; thereby, other 
actors affected by the subsidized products, such as producers and the fi nal consumers, are 
not taken into account explicitly beyond their standing within a state’s national econo-
my.199 As a reaction to alleged adverse effects, such countervailing subsidies amount to 
further governmental interference with the market mechanisms and are thus subjected 
to particular provisions set out in Part V of the SCM Agreement.
197 See also Luengo Hernández de Madrid, above n. 99, at 161/162; Horlick/Clarke, above n. 99, at 28; Brunel & 
Hufbauer, above n.16, at 8, 10.
198 According to Art. 7 of the SCM Agreement, any member having reason to believe that a subsidy amounts to 
adverse effects and is thus actionable under the Agreement may request consultations with the other (subsidizing) member. 
This also corresponds with Art. XVI GATT. If the consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within sixty 
days, any party to the consultations may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for the establishment of 
a panel; panel reports may be appealed and thus subjected to the Appellate Body proceedings. According to the reference 
provided in Art. 30 of the SCM Agreement, Arts XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 apply to consultations and the settle-
ment of disputes.
199 On this note see Benitah, above n. 99, at 98–101.
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According to the outline given above,200 the substantial support of the automobile 
industry by nation states may amount to a potential and specifi c subsidy according to the 
WTO/GATT legal framework. However, the fi nancial contributions provided for sus-
taining a real economy market sector are not prohibited as such under international trade 
regulations; moreover, their treatment according to the traffi c light approach adopted 
by the SCM Agreement depends on their individual embodiment and the context in 
which they are applied in. As a consequence, the classifi cation of a fi nancial benefi t as a 
prohibited subsidy according to Part II of the SCM Agreement can be prevented rather 
easily by a supporting state. Nevertheless, the qualifi cation of the governmental support 
as amounting to actionable subsidies in the long term provides for further challenges. As 
outlined above,201 several lines of argumentation exist in an individual case to either 
argument in favour of a subsidies’ actionability or not.
As a general rule and guiding principle for ascertaining a defi nition of actionable 
subsidies, the conceptualization of the ‘distortions’ in question needs to be considered 
for an assessment of a subsidy. The subsidization of the automobile sectors may have 
an effect on the prices of cars benefi ting from governmentally supported production 
processes, thus generally enabling the supported car producers to reduce market prices. 
The apprehension is brought forward that, under such circumstances, the market posi-
tion of automobile enterprises that do not receive corresponding funding is threatened. 
A traditional view perceives subsidies as a practice distorting the natural  comparative 
advantage between trading countries, due to the fact that they give wrong signals regard-
ing the allocation of resources. Overproduction of the subsidized goods, stemming from 
distorted production costs, for example, is then linked to an underproduction of more 
socially valued goods, leading to a welfare loss for the world economy, ‘insofar as the 
subsidized goods prevent the importation and thus the production of similar goods pro-
duced in a more effi cient way in other countries’.202
However, it is important to note that interferences with the market processes in 
national economies do not necessarily entail a disturbance of international economical 
relations:
[N]ot just any ‘distortion’ should suffi ce for the international system to take action. In some sense, 
every governmental action that impinges on the economy creates a ‘distortion’. (…) However, it is 
a legitimate choice for a national sovereign to accept lower economic welfare in order to promote 
certain societal and governmental objectives (such as redistribution of income, or support for the 
handicapped). As long as the government’s action are taken in such a way that the costs are borne 
only by that society, it seems inappropriate for other nations in the world to complain.203
The privileged treatment under the formerly existing Article 8.2(a) and 8.2(c) of the 
SCM Agreement of research and development subsidies and subsidies provided as assis-
tance to promote adaptation to new environmental requirements, was fully coherent 
200 See 5.1/5.2.
201 See 5.4.
202 Benitah, above n. 99, at 252.
203 Jackson, above n. 90, at 298–299. See also the examples for such a ‘sophisticated view of distortions’ provided 
by Benitah, above n. 99, at 254–256; see also Grave, above n. 99, at 130–133 on the function of the subsidy concept and 
at 258 et seq.
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with the logic of taking into account possible positive external effects that compensate 
comparative advantage ‘distortions’.204 However, it is obvious that considering both posi-
tive and  negative external effects of subsidies in the calculation of ‘net countervailable 
subsidies’ would amount to a rather insurmountable task for any legal system.205
In sum, although the concept of ‘distortion’ is an essential guide for interpreting 
subsidies and measures implemented in their response, the various meanings of ‘distor-
tion’ and the manifold implementations as well as the fact that no exact defi nition is 
provided on an international level, lead to a situation in which it is impossible to foresee 
the actual application of such guidelines neither by the national authorities nor on an 
international level.206 As a consequence, an assessment on a case-by-case basis is crucial.
6. Outlook
At present, it seems to be too early to assess the actual trade effects the governmen-
tal measures will have, since their announcements continue and adaptations to the 
altering situations proceed. Despite such a caveat, it can be concluded that it is com-
monly acknowledged – not least according to economic theories on free trade – that 
 governments do have a role to play in the free markets and may even possess particular 
responsibilities to intervene in certain constellations. Therefore, governmental support 
of particular real economy sectors can be in compliance with the WTO/GATT legal 
frameworks as long as their provisions and principles are respected; governments thus 
possess considerable leeway within international trade law regarding the extent of their 
participation in the free markets. In a nutshell and for the present contribution, it can be 
inferred that legality and illegality of subsidies are dependent on their individual arrange-
ments and the actual contexts they are applied in.
Notwithstanding such a legal assessment, these measures may nevertheless be in 
breach of spirit and purpose of free trade theories. From an economic point of view, 
state aid may be perceived as preventing necessary market adaptations to new situations. 
Seen from this angle, the collapse would provide for a valuable opportunity to facilitate 
structural reform, which may even include the necessity to produce less cars, for example. 
Arguably, governmental sector support should thereby be confi ned to sectors that are of 
systemic importance to the functioning of the wider economy.207
Corresponding to the fi nding that free trade theory and the applicable interna-
tional legal frameworks are not necessarily congruent, warnings against protectionism 
and against the risks that protectionist measures may entail for the worldwide economic 
situation have been repeated. At the G20 conference, the leading industrial and  emerging 
204 See Benitah, above n. 99, at 265–267, listing traditional examples for activities with positive effects such as educa-
tion, vaccination, and public transportation. Their subsidization should be admitted in order to avoid their underproduction 
relative to what society really desires. Furthermore, e.g. a subsidy helping to prevent environmental degradation can be 
interpreted as a response to already existing imperfections of market signals due to the fact that environmental costs are 
often ignored in price calculations.
205 Benitah, above n. 99, at 273–275.
206 Benitah, above n. 99, at 280.
207 OECD Report, Going for Growth, above n. 58, at 20, 24–25.
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countries verbosely expressed their concerns on increased trade barriers and their will-
ingness to come to an agreement in the ongoing Doha Rounds of negotiations.208 
According to different international studies, however, seventeen of the twenty states 
themselves introduced barriers to trade in light of the ongoing economic crisis;209 the 
analysis ‘On the fi nancial and economic crisis and trade-related developments’ under-
taken by the WTO at the beginning of April 2009 gives an impressive overview on 
spreading protectionist measures.210
However, the different fora concerned with the current crisis are not in the posi-
tion of preventing further interventions by other means than by trying to convince their 
Member States to adhere to the principles of free markets. Additionally, the WTO has 
assumed a monitoring function under the auspices of the Trade Policy Review Body 
(TPRB), which is held to discuss on a regular basis the most recent trade-related devel-
opments and provide corresponding reports. The WTO has furthermore established a 
task force within its Secretariat with an advisory role regarding the trade implications of 
the economic crisis. Effective monitoring is carried out at regular intervals and needs to 
be based on accurate information; the WTO has to rely on its members and their noti-
fi cations of the measures taken.211 Reliable information is a fi rst step towards enabling 
concerted action on an international level for securing free markets and improving the 
coordination of national and international responses.
The specifi c focus on the market branch of the automotive industry − an economic 
branch of importance primarily in industrialized countries − shall not cloud a more 
holistic view of the present crisis situation, which has particular impacts for the most 
vulnerable participants on the global markets. Moreover, it provides for an example of the 
challenges implicated by governmental support of the real economy. A particular threat 
of developing countries’ global trade shares would risk to call into question one of the 
main factors legitimizing the current multilateral trading system.212 Furthermore, newest 
estimates of the WTO-Secretariat expect a decrease in world trade for 2009 of about 
9%.213 The strengthened and liberalized market access envisaged with the conclusion of 
the Doha negotiations itself is estimated to stimulate the economy with approximately 
USD 150 billion. It is in light of such considerations that the WTO reiterates and aims 
at the negotiations’ positive outcome. Besides offi cially supporting this endeavour, WTO 
Member States could take decisive and perhaps more credible steps themselves by no 
longer taking advantage of the legal gray areas inherent in the WTO framework.
208 See above n. 11.
209 See E. Gamberoni & R. Newfarmer, ‘Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrisome Trends’, Trade Notes 
Number 37, International Trade Department: World Bank, 2 Mar. 2009, <www.worldbank.org/trade> (visited 23 Jun. 
2009).
210 See second WTO Report to the TPRB from the Director-General on the Financial and Economic Crisis and 
Trade-Related Developments, 20 Apr.2009, WTO Doc. WT/TRP/OV/W1. See also third Report on the Financial and 
Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 57.
211 First Report to the TPRB on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, above n. 
14, at para. 6.
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213 See the WTO 2009 Press Release, World Trade 2008, Prospects for 2009, <www.wto.org/english/news_e/
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